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Consider four different potential plaintiffs. Plaintiff A is a
city resident. Believing-incorrectly-that he has a prior arrest
record for larceny, federal officials place his name on a list of sus-
pected criminals circulated to local businesses.1 Plaintiff B is a
city employee. Disliking B, B's supervisor denigrates him publicly
and transfers him to an undesirable position.2 Plaintiff C is also a
city employee. After her coworkers publicly accuse her of putting
a voodoo curse on one of them, the city manager fires her.3 Plain-
tiff D is a landlord of a beachfront property. The local government
places a placard on the property announcing that weekend
renters violated noise ordinances.4 D can't find new renters.
As a result of these experiences, each prospective plaintiffs
reputation may have been ruined. For redress, some could rely on
state tort remedies for defamation.5 By necessity-or strategy-
others might prefer to vindicate their rights in federal court. To
t BA 2012, Swarthmore College; JD Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago
Law School.
I See Paul v Davis, 424 US 693, 694-96 (1976).
2 This example is strictly hypothetical.
3 See Velez v Levy, 401 F3d 75, 81-83 (2d Cir 2005).
4 See URI Student Senate v Town of Narragansett, 631 F3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir 2011).
5 See, for example, Byers v Snyder, 237 P3d 1258, 1270 (Kan App 2010) (describing
the elements of a defamation claim under Kansas law); Taus v Loftus, 151 P3d 1185, 1209
(Cal 2007) (describing the elements of a defamation claim under California law).
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do so, they could bring a procedural due process challenge alleg-
ing that the government 6 provided insufficient procedural protec-
tions before depriving them of a liberty or property interest7-if
they could prove that reputation was such an interest.8
In Paul v Davis,9 the Supreme Court held that reputation
alone does not qualify as a liberty interest sufficient to support a
procedural due process challenge.1 0 But the federal courts have
paved a narrow path forward for claims predicated on reputa-
tional injuries. Complainants may bring a "stigma-plus" claim by
pointing to both a state actor's defamatory statement (the
"stigma") and an accompanying loss of a liberty or property inter-
est (the "plus"), such as state employment."
This formulation is puzzling. It is not unusual for courts to
react skeptically to attempts to raise novel claims in federal court.
But the hurdle the stigma-plus claim erects between injury and
relief-requiring prospective plaintiffs to allege a specific addi-
tional harm-is out of the ordinary. This design choice generates
novel challenges for courts seeking to determine whether the hur-
dle has been overcome.
This Comment draws on the design and purpose of the
stigma-plus claim to investigate one of these challenges: whether
plaintiffs must allege that the same actor was responsible for both
the stigma and plus elements in a stigma-plus claim. Another way
of asking this question is to consider which of the prospective
plaintiffs introduced above has a viable claim and which does not.
The holding in Davis renders the complaint of Plaintiff A, the
pure-stigma plaintiff, dead on arrival in federal court. Plaintiff B
is the archetypal stigma-plus complainant: both stigma and plus
are easily attributed to a single actor. Plaintiffs C, the different-
actor plaintiff, and D, the private-actor plaintiff, are less easily
resolved.
6 Which government entities are accused of inflicting stigma plus may shape the
type of claim litigants could bring. Plaintiffs may seek damages from state or city officials
only through 42 USC § 1983 actions and from federal officials only through a parallel fed-
eral common-law claim. See Part I.C.
7 See US Const Amend V; US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
s Other conceivable complaints (such as state-law contract claims) stemming from
the prospective plaintiffs' experiences are unexamined in this Comment.
9 424 US 693 (1976).
10 Id at 701.
11 Id at 710-11. See also Sadallah v City of Utica, 383 F3d 34, 38 (2d Cir 2004) (de-
scribing requirements of the test in detail). For discussion of which liberty interests qualify
under this formulation, see Part I.D.2.
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Federal circuit courts have arrived at different answers to
this question, and determining where to draw the line of cogniza-
bility yields important insights about the stigma-plus claim. The
First Circuit requires the same state actor to supply both ele-
ments.1 2 As a result, in the First Circuit, only Plaintiff B could
plead a viable stigma-plus claim. By contrast, the Second Circuit
allows the two elements to derive from different sources.1 3 As a
result, both Plaintiffs B and C could plead a viable stigma-plus
claim. The circuit is less clear on which actor should face liability
and whether both must be state actors. It appears to conclude that
the source that provided the plus may be held liable.14 It also ap-
pears to require the plus itself to be supplied by a state actor. 5
Without addressing this question directly, some circuits take this
logic a step further, implying that even Plaintiff D could plead a
stigma-plus claim under the right circumstances.16
Existing scholarship has not addressed the split between these
two circuits.17 It focuses instead on criticizing the peculiarity or
novelty of the stigma-plus claim.18 As a result, existing scholarship
has done little to articulate the logic of the stigma-plus claim or to
12 URI Student Senate, 631 F3d at 10-11.
13 See Velez, 401 F3d at 89.
14 See, for example, id at 93. See also text accompanying notes 152-53.
15 See id at 89 & n 12. See also notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
16 See, for example, Gwinn v Awmiller, 354 F3d 1211, 1216, 1222-23 (10th Cir 2004)
(concluding that erroneous classification of a sex offender could support viable claims for
procedural due process harms); Dupuy v Samuels, 397 F3d 493, 511 (7th Cir 2005) (allow-
ing childcare workers listed on an abuse registry to plead stigma-plus injuries when their
lost employment opportunities were, in part, private). The Second Circuit appears to agree
on this point. See Valmonte v Bane, 18 F3d 992, 1001-02 (2d Cir 1994) (offering logic sim-
ilar to Dupuy).
17 There is, however, some scholarship discussing the decisions that generated the
split. See, for example, Breegan Semonelli, Comment, Insult to Injury: A Constitutional
Challenge to Rhode Island's Most Colorful Shaming, 21 Roger Williams U L Rev 611, 626-
34 (2016) (discussing URI Student Senate).
18 See, for example, Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm:
Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 UC Davis L Rev 79, 82, 90-98, 100-06 (2009) (criticizing the
stigma-plus doctrine and urging its reconsideration on the grounds that it relies on "im-
poverished constructions" of liberty and reputation); Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputa-
tion, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 Stan L Rev 191, 203-09,
230-38 (1977) (criticizing the Davis decision and advocating a requirement of stigmatizing
intent). Other scholarship merely outlines the contours of the claim without offering sig-
nificant commentary. See, for example, David C. Weiss, Note, Nothing Improper? Exam-
ining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, and Pretextual
Justification in the U.S. Attorney Removals, 107 Mich L Rev 317, 346-47 (2008) (outlining
the doctrinal requirements of a stigma-plus claim); Erwin Chemerinsky, Qualified Im-
munity: § 1983 Litigation in the Public Employment Context, 21 Touro L Rev 551, 558-61,
569 (2005) (discussing the stigma-plus doctrine in public employment).
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supply tools for examining emerging questions like the multiple-
actor problem.
This Comment fills this gap by investigating the claim in
depth and advancing a framework for answering the multiple-
actor problem. Part I explores the background of procedural due
process, federal constitutional torts, and stigma-plus claims gen-
erally. Part II describes the circuits' competing approaches to the
source-of-harm question. Part III answers the question presented
by the courts' divergence in two Sections. First, Part III.A derives
the purpose of the stigma-plus claim by drawing analogies be-
tween the stigma-plus claim and plus enhancements attached to
other civil rights claims. It determines that the claim represents
the courts' inchoate sense that stigma and plus represent addi-
tional or heightened harm in combination. The hurdle the claim
imposes on plaintiffs is best thought of as a causation test rather
than pure disapproval of reputational injury. Part III.A ends by
investigating causally complex stigma-plus claims. It finds the
causation story consistent with these approaches. Second,
Part III.B draws on these insights to evaluate which circuit's
approach to the multiple-actor problem best vindicates the
stigma-plus claim's purpose. While both circuits' approaches ap-
pear designed to scrutinize proximate causation, both are under-
inclusive, raising formal barriers to a set of claims that logically
seem cognizable as stigma plus. This shortcoming leads both ap-
proaches to underdeter, empowering not only violations of pro-
tected liberty interests, but also free riding by the second actor in
a putative stigma-plus claim. Yet there are two reasons to be less
concerned about the Second Circuit's flavor of underdeterrence.
First, the Second Circuit's underdeterrence of private actors may
be justified under the state-action requirement.1 9 Second, the
Second Circuit's contextual approach to stigma-plus claims may
enable the court to reach a subset of these actions. With these
issues resolved, the Second Circuit provides the best resolution of
the question of which actors may supply the different elements of
the stigma-plus claim.
I. ORIGINS OF STIGMA PLUS
The stigma-plus claim is an outgrowth of two interrelated de-
velopments that preoccupied twentieth-century American courts.
First, courts began to evaluate which types of claims were entitled
19 See Part III.B.4.
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to procedural due process protection. Despite the "procedural"
moniker, procedural due process claims raise the threshold sub-
stantive question whether the right or interest underlying the
claim merits due process protection.20 The growth of the adminis-
trative state and shifting conceptions of Americans' rights and en-
titlements challenged the courts to determine which interests
warranted this protection.21 In articulating the stigma-plus claim,
the Supreme Court concluded that reputation alone does not qual-
ify as such an interest-but that stigma plus something else
does.22
Second, courts began to reconsider which mechanisms plain-
tiffs could use to bring constitutional claims-including claims for
procedural due process-into federal court. 23 The mere prospect of
a constitutional violation does not create a cause of action. For
this, plaintiffs turned to federal constitutional torts. Federal
constitutional-tort actions are actions for damages available
against state actors under 42 USC § 1983 and against federal ac-
tors under the parallel common-law claim provided by Bivens v
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.24
Federal constitutional torts provide an opportunity for plaintiffs
with constitutional grievances-from allegations that they were
subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure in contravention
of the Fourth Amendment to allegations that they were subjected
to cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth
20 See, for example, Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 262-63 (1970) (addressing
whether the deprivation of welfare benefits qualifies as a protected interest before discuss-
ing whether sufficient procedural protections were in place). See also Edward L. Rubin,
Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Cal L Rev 1044, 1065-69 (1984) (describing
the Court's modern approach to determining which interests warrant procedural due pro-
cess protection).
21 Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1048-52 (cited in note 20).
22 Davis, 424 US at 710-12.
23 See Part I.D.
24 403 US 388, 391-92, 395-97 (1971) (inferring from the Fourth Amendment a cause
of action in federal court for money damages against federal officers); Davis v Passman,
442 US 228, 242-44 (1979) (applying the logic of Bivens to the Fifth Amendment). Despite
the availability of this avenue, Bivens actions today provide a limited path for relief.
Courts have articulated significant impediments to such actions. See, for example, Bush v
Lucas, 462 US 367, 378, 388 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens claim when Congress had provided
an alternative remedy); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v Meyer, 510 US 471, 485-
86 (1994) (rejecting a Bivens claim against a federal agency); Wilkie v Robbins, 551 US
537, 555 (2007) (rejecting a Bivens claim when it would be too difficult for courts to devise
a "workable cause of action"). Some of Bivens's influential critics have sought to overrule
it altogether. See, for example, Wilkie, 551 US at 568 (Thomas concurring) ("Bivens is a
relic of the heady days in which the Court assumed common-law powers to create causes
of action.").
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Amendment-to seek damages and have their day in court. An
innovation of the Reconstruction era, federal constitutional torts
were relegated to relative obscurity until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury.25 Once reinvigorated, however, they resulted in an explosion
of litigation in the federal courts-and provoked a counterreaction. 26
The stigma-plus claim was devised as these two develop-
ments-the rapid expansion of interests qualifying for procedural
due process protection and the rediscovery of the federal consti-
tutional tort as a viable means of securing this protection-came
to a head. Below, Parts L.A and I.B explore the origins and con-
tours of the modern procedural due process right, examining its
operation and the requirements it imposes on putative liberty in-
terests. Part I.C provides an abbreviated history of the federal
constitutional tort, focusing on § 1983. Finally, drawing on these
histories, Part I.D traces the development of the stigma-plus
claim.
A. Origins of Procedural Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."27 The Fourteenth Amendment applies the
same text to the states. 28 The due process protections supply both
substantive and procedural constraints. Substantive due process
involves protecting individuals from government interference
with fundamental rights irrespective of the applicable procedural
protections.29 Procedural due process, by contrast, concerns pro-
cedural constraints on the manner in which persons may be de-
prived of rights or entitlements.30 But procedural due process
25 James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 393, 407-18 (2003) (discussing the history of constitutional-tort actions).
26 See id at 416 (discussing the expansion of constitutional-tort litigation in the mid-
twentieth century). For the limitations that more recent Supreme Court decisions have
imposed on Bivens remedies, see the cases discussed in note 24.
27 US Const Amend V.
28 US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
29 See Michael Wells and Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope
of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga L Rev 201, 215 (1984). For example, the government may
not forcibly sterilize "habitual criminals" or criminalize the access to or prescription of
contraceptives, regardless of whether it provides procedural protections. See Skinner v
Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 536-37, 541 (1942); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 486-88
(1965) (Goldberg concurring).
30 For an explanation of some of the differences between substantive and procedural
due process protections, see Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform":
Procedural Due Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 Admin L Rev 591, 603 (1998).
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raises its own substantive considerations in requiring courts to
determine to which rights or entitlements its protection applies.
Courts' approach to procedural due process has shifted over
time.31 Under the conventional account, the Framers conceived of
the right to due process as entailing principally those protections
"inherent in the trial process."32 Similarly, the property and lib-
erty interests entitled to constitutional protection were those that
"enjoy[ed] protection at common law against invasion by private
parties," such as government efforts to collect a fine or tax.33 The
administrative state disrupted this framework. Its development
raised the questions of what procedural protections were required
in administrative rulemaking34 and administrative adjudication35
and provoked courts to reconsider which interests required this
protection.
B. The Modern Approach to Procedural Due Process
The Court articulated the contours of the modern procedural
due process right in a pair of decisions concerning whether unten-
ured state-university professors were entitled to a hearing before
31 See generally Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev 1044 (cited in note 20).
32 See id at 1048 (describing the British jurists' understanding of the phrase "due
process," which informed the Framing). See also, for example, Stephen F. Williams, "Lib-
erty" in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers'
Intentions, 53 U Colo L Rev 117, 126-27 (1981) (arguing that the Due Process Clause,
other than the just compensation requirement, was intended to relate exclusively to crim-
inal trials); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 S Ct Rev 85, 96, 99-
100 (describing the English and American origins of the Due Process Clause); Edward S.
Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Mich L Rev 643, 664 (1909)
(describing as "the view of the Common Law" that "liberty" in the Due Process Clause
"means simply freedom from physical distraint"). Revisionists have countered that sub-
stantive conceptions of due process are in fact consistent with original conceptions of the
Constitution. See, for example, Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990
Wis L Rev 941, 941 (arguing that the "informed person in 1791" probably would have un-
derstood the Due Process Clause to include substantive protections).
33 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L
Rev 1667, 1717 (1975).
34 See, for example, Londoner v City and County of Denver, 210 US 373, 378-79
(1908) (excluding a street-paving ordinance from due process scrutiny despite irregular-
ities in the drafting process). For further development of this doctrine over time, see Bi-
Metallic Investment Co v State Board of Equalization, 239 US 441, 445-46 (1915);
United States v Florida East Coast Railway Co, 410 US 224, 245-46 (1973). See also 5
USC § 551(5) (defining "rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).
35 See, for example, Ohio Valley Water Co v Ben Avon Borough, 253 US 287, 295-97
(1920) (determining that due process required de novo review of agency decision-making).
See also 5 USC § 551(7) (defining "adjudication" under the APA).
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termination: Board of Regents v Roth36 and Perry v Sindermann.37
These decisions formally delineated a two-step procedure that in-
quired (1) whether an interest qualified as a liberty or property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause and (2) whether the
requisite procedures had been followed.38
Moreover, they shifted the touchstone for whether an interest
qualified for procedural due process protection from the weight of
the claimant's interest39 to the nature of the interest itself.40 To
claim a property interest after Roth and Perry, a person needed a
"legitimate claim of entitlement" to the underlying benefit.41 Le-
gitimate claims of property entitlement came not from the
Constitution but from "existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."42 For claimed lib-
erty interests, the Court in Roth provided no touchstone. It relied
instead on a broad conception of liberty stretching from the right
to contract to the right to "acquire useful knowledge" and the
right to "enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."43
The Court soon sought to reduce the asymmetry. It first de-
termined that the existence of an independent underlying right
36 408 US 564, 566-69 (1972).
37 408 US 593, 602 & n 7 (1972).
38 See Roth, 408 US at 569-70.
39 See Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 262 & n 8, 263 (1970) (articulating this short-
lived balancing approach in concluding that welfare benefits were entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing before their benefits were terminated). In contrast to the modern two-step
inquiry, Professor Mark Tushnet has called the Goldberg approach a "unitary" analysis
that folds together the questions of whether an interest qualified for protection and what
protection was due. See Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 S Ct Rev 261, 262. See also generally Charles A. Reich, The
New Property, 73 Yale L J 733 (1964).
40 Roth, 408 US at 570-71.
41 Id at 577. This approach is often described as "positivist" in order "to indicate that
the Court requires some underlying positive law right before the due process protections
apply." Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1071 n 141 (cited in note 20). As Professor Edward Rubin
points out, the term "positivist" is inapposite insofar as it connotes merely the requirement
that true legal rules originate from an authoritative source. Id. The notion that a lawmak-
ing authority could not create "purely procedural rights, unattached to underlying rights,"
is in tension with positivism. Id. Instead, the Court has crafted its own distinct philosophy
of due process, which requires a predicate underlying right in order for procedural due
process protection to attach. Id. Following Rubin, this Comment refers to this theory as
the "underlying-rights approach." See id.
42 Roth, 408 US at 577. In Roth, no such source could be found. Id. By contrast, in
Perry, the plaintiff could claim reliance on statements in the college's faculty guide that
appeared to institute an informal tenure system. Perry, 408 US at 600.
43 Roth, 408 US at 572 (quotation marks omitted), citing Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US
390, 399 (1923).
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could be a sufficient predicate for a liberty interest to receive pro-
cedural due process protection.44 Liberty interests could derive
from revocation of state parole45 or denial of prison good-time
credit4 even though those interests were not independently guar-
anteed by the Constitution.47 Addressing the latter claim, the
Court explicitly noted that the "analysis as to liberty parallels the
accepted due process analysis as to property."48
The Court then went a step further, concluding that the ex-
istence of an independent underlying right was necessary as well
as sufficient for due process protection to attach.49 Meachum v
Fano'O represents an example of this approach.51 In Meachum, the
Court considered whether an inmate's involuntary transfer be-
tween prison facilities implicated interests that warranted proce-
dural due process protection.52 Because transfer was entirely dis-
cretionary, there was no state-law basis for the asserted liberty
interest.13 This time, the Court was unwilling to mine the Consti-
tution for the expansive concepts of liberty the Roth Court in-
voked. Instead, it refused to give the concept of liberty "any inde-
pendent force."54 Prison transfers governed by discretionary state
arrangements implicate no liberty interests cognizable under the
Due Process Clause.55
The Court's commitment to an underlying-rights approach
has not been entirely consistent over time.6 But it is the logic the
44 See Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 557 (1974) (drawing a parallel between liberty
and property interests); Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1073 (cited in note 20) (suggesting the
Court in Wolff meant to indicate "that liberty interests over and above those inherent in
the due process clause could be created by state law, just as property interests of all kinds
were created"), citing Wolff, 418 US at 557. See also Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 481-
82 (1972) (finding a liberty interest implicated by revocation of state parole based exclu-
sively on state statutory law).
45 See Morrissey, 408 US at 481-82.
46 See Wolff, 418 US at 557.
47 See id; Morrissey, 408 US at 480-81.
48 Wolff, 418 US at 557.
49 See Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1073-76 (cited in note 20).
50 427 US 215 (1976).
51 Id at 225.
52 Id at 223-29.
53 See id at 225-29.
54 Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1076 (cited in note 20).
55 Meachum, 427 US at 225.
56 In his 1984 article, Rubin characterizes this "high water mark of the underlying
rights approach" as a short-lived doctrinal experiment that was subsequently "domesti-
cated." Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1076, 1078 (cited in note 20). He points to several cases in
which the Court "cast away the underlying rights requirement" in favor of finding rights
inherent in the Due Process Clause with "rousing citation[s]" to sources like Blackstone
and the Court's substantive due process case law. See id at 1077 (analyzing this trend over
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Court deployed in Davis to reach the conclusion that reputational
injury was not an underlying liberty interest warranting proce-
dural due process protection,57 paving the way for the stigma-plus
claim.
C. Federal Constitutional Torts
The strength of novel procedural due process claims is neces-
sarily limited by the vehicles through which such claims may be
steered into court. Put simply, the measure of such a right is in
its remedy. Perhaps the best (while not the only)58 cause of action
for vindicating constitutional rights in federal court is the 42 USC
§ 1983 action and its federal common-law counterpart under
Bivens.69 Section 1983 permits civil damages actions to be brought
against those who deprived others of constitutional or statutory
rights "under color" of state law.60 Similarly, Bivens actions ena-
ble plaintiffs to bring civil damages actions against government
several cases). Viewed on a longer time horizon, the Court's approach grows difficult to
generalize. While the Court has generally hewed to liberty interests with a statutory hook,
it occasionally diverges. See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 959-62 (Wolters
Kluwer 7th ed 2013) (describing the Court as generally reluctant to find liberty interests
without statutory entitlements, but as more willing to do so in the liberty than property
context).
57 See Davis, 424 US at 711-13.
58 Some constitutional rights may be vindicated without an independent cause of ac-
tion. For example, the exclusionary rule deters violations of the protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment without requiring a separate
trial. See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas concurring) (describing the pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures as a "dead letter" without the protec-
tion of the exclusionary rule). Instead of bringing a separate civil case, a defendant may
seek to exclude the impermissibly obtained evidence at her criminal trial. But the exclu-
sionary rule itself has profound limitations, see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals
Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U Ill L Rev 363, 368-72, and not all areas of
constitutional law provide a ready-made litigation context comparable to the criminal
trial.
59 Bivens, 403 US at 388.
60 Ku Klux Klan Act § 1, 17 Stat 13, 13, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1983. The
modern codification-modified from the original to provide protection for deprivations of
statutory rights, see US Rev Stat § 1979 (1875) (adding "and laws")-reads in relevant
part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
See also Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 7-8 (1980).
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actors depriving persons of constitutional rights while acting un-
der color of federal law.61
These, too, are relatively recent innovations. Section 1983
was originally a product of Reconstruction, but its reach was
swiftly cabined by restrictive interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 It spent the better part of the following century
dormant3 before being revived by the Supreme Court in the mid-
twentieth century.
In Monroe v Pape64 and successive decisions,65 the Supreme
Court reverted to a broad interpretation of "under color" of state
law and began developing a "federal common law of constitutional
torts."66 Bivens actions were devised contemporaneously.67 In
Monroe, for example, the Court concluded that § 1983 reached ac-
tions not authorized by state law and permitted a cause of action
under § 1983 even if state law provided its own tort remedy.68 In
the decades hence, § 1983 litigation increased to a "striking" de-
gree. 69 Plaintiffs have brought successful § 1983 actions on a
broad set of claims, ranging from prisoners' First Amendment
61 Bivens, 403 US at 396-97.
62 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US 36, 73-80 (1872) (determining that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not federalize substantive rights beyond those that were in-
cidents of federal citizenship); United States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 554 (1875) (finding
that private conspiracies for deprivations of civil rights lack the requisite state action). See
also Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich L Rev
1323, 1336-43 (1952).
63 Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 NYU L Rev 1, 9 (1985).
64 365 US 167 (1961). The Monroe Court drew on tentative early efforts to relax the
state-action requirement. See generally Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948); Screws v
United States, 325 US 91 (1945); Smith v Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944); United States v
Classic, 313 US 299 (1941).
65 See, for example, McNeese v Board of Education, 373 US 668, 676 (1963) (permit-
ting plaintiffs to bring § 1983 actions before exhausting state and local administrative
remedies). The reinvigorated § 1983 provoked a storm of constitutional litigation, prompt-
ing such far-reaching claims as challenges to loyalty oaths, see, for example, Keyishan v
Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 592-93 (1967), and termination of welfare benefits, see, for
example, Goldberg, 397 US at 255.
66 Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on
Section 1988, 133 U Pa L Rev 601, 604 (1985).
67 See Bivens, 403 US at 396-97.
68 Monroe, 365 US at 183.
69 Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv L Rev 1133,
1172 (1977) ("In 1960 only two hundred and eighty suits were filed in federal court under
all the civil rights acts; . .. in 1972 approximately eight thousand claims were filed under
section 1983 alone."). See also Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich L Rev 5,
6 (1980) ("In 1976, almost one out of every three 'private' federal question suits filed in the
federal courts was a civil rights action against a state or local official.").
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claims to public employees' claims to procedural due process.7 0 Re-
gardless of the specific underlying claim, § 1983 typically requires
state action: the defendant generally must be either acting on be-
half of or performing duties traditionally carried out by the
state. 71
The modern § 1983 has been a lightning rod for criticism.
Critics have leveled several primary objections. First, they point
to an outsized impact on federal dockets. 2 In addition to overbur-
dening the courts, one critic argues that modern § 1983 litiga-
tion reduces collegiality and predictability, raising the prospect
of "dilut[ing] and thus debas[ing] constitutional values."73 As Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun pointed out, this objection is strange: § 1983
is "not an independent source of constitutional or statutory
rights," but "only a vehicle for substantive claims that have their
base elsewhere."74 As such, Blackmun argues that "[m]any com-
plaints about § 1983's ostensible impact . .. are complaints about
the breadth of the underlying constitutional rights."75
Other criticisms may land a stronger punch. Critics have
urged that the Court's § 1983 jurisprudence is beset by "doctrinal
confusion" and internal contradiction, inflicting on the courts not
just volume but excessive complexity.76 Critics have also raised
70 For examples of these and similar applications, see Blackmun, 60 NYU L Rev at
20 (cited in note 63) (collecting cases).
71 See Julie K. Brown, Note, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73
Mo L Rev 561, 564-68 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court's different state-action tests);
Richard H.W. Maloy, "Under Color Of"-What Does It Mean?, 56 Mercer L Rev 565, 599-645
(2005) (same). See also Lugar v Edmonson Oil Co, 457 US 922, 935 n 18, 936-39 (1982).
72 See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal
Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 L & Soc Order
557, 563-71 (describing a "deluge" of § 1983 cases in the federal courts); Note, Limiting
the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 Harv L Rev 1486, 1487 n 12
(1969) (claiming that § 1983 litigation produced more pages of reported cases in February
1969 than all but two other federal statutes); Thiboutot, 448 US at 34-37 (Powell dissent-
ing) (criticizing the extension of § 1983 liability to statutory protections on the grounds
that "literally hundreds of cooperative regulatory and social welfare enactments may be
affected").
73 See Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 27 (cited in note 69).
74 Blackmun, 60 NYU L Rev at 22 (cited in note 63).
75 Id. One commentator flips Blackmun's remarks around, suggesting that § 1983
may warrant as little credit as blame. See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved:
Beyond the "Unhappy History" Theory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L Rev 737,
747-48. Professor Louise Weinberg suggests that it was the Court's rights revolution, and
not its cause-of-action innovations, that was responsible for the impact of Monroe. See id
at 746-50.
76 See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 Cornell L Rev 482, 487-91 (1982). See also Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 7 (cited
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federalism concerns, objecting that the Court's expansive inter-
pretations of § 1983 improperly import state-law claims into a
federal context.77
As a descriptive matter, this discomfort with the wide scope
of federal constitutional torts has had a considerable effect. It has
been the impetus for a wide range of doctrines structuring and
constricting § 1983 and Bivens claims.78 While formally a con-
straint on interests cognizable as procedural due process claims,
stigma plus is arguably one such doctrine.
D. Arriving at the "Stigma-Plus" Doctrine
Davis emerged from these converging developments of insta-
bility in procedural due process doctrine and voluminous federal
constitutional-torts litigation. As Part I.B explained, the Court
was in the process of revising its approach to procedural due pro-
cess, clarifying how courts could determine which interests qual-
ified for procedural due process protection. Simultaneously, the
Court faced the flood of constitutional-torts litigation-and re-
sulting criticism--described in Part 1.C. Davis was the product of
both shifts.
In Davis, the Court considered whether state defamation,
standing alone, stated a claim for relief under § 1983 and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 The Court had
previously blessed several reputation-based claims for relief.80
in note 69) (criticizing the complexity of § 1983 litigation for generating "an elaborate, and
often unpredictable, game").
77 See, for example, Aldisert, 1973 L & Soc Order at 572-74 (cited in note 72) (dis-
puting whether § 1983 enforcement belongs in federal courts and expressing concern that
§ 1983 "substitute[s] jural impressionism for fixed and uniform standards of external con-
duct" in the state common-law arenas of contracts or torts); Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at
30-38 (cited in note 69) (describing § 1983's displacement of state lawmaking authority);
Note, 82 Harv L Rev at 1487 (cited in note 72) ("[F]ederal jurisdiction has been extended
to . .. cases . . . minor enough to raise doubts whether they belong in federal court yet
which may simultaneously involve important state interests."); Gene R. Nichol Jr, Feder-
alism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 Va L Rev 959, 993-1000 (1987) (explaining that
the scope of modern privileges and immunities yields a much more intrusive § 1983 than
its drafters envisioned). But see Blackmun, 60 NYU L Rev at 21-24 (cited in note 63)
(rejecting federalism critiques).
78 See Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 6-7 & nn 11-19 (cited in note 69) (describing a
laundry list of court-driven limitations "that, in purpose or effect, discourage section 1983
litigants and dispose of specific cases," including standing, res judicata, and strict statu-
tory construction).
79 Davis, 424 US at 694.
80 See, for example, Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183, 190-91 (1952) (finding that
a loyalty oath requirement violated due process in part on the grounds that exclusion
from public employment on disloyalty grounds constituted a "badge of infamy"); Joint
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But in Davis, the Court reconsidered; without overturning its
precedents, it constrained the types of reputational injuries it
would permit.81 This move drew on its new determination to scru-
tinize both procedural due process and federal constitutional-tort
claims for an adequate statutory or constitutional basis.82
1. Initial approaches to reputational injury.
In previous cases, the Court had permitted plaintiffs to state
a procedural due process claim for what were essentially reputa-
tional injuries. In Wisconsin v Constantineau,83 for example, the
Court considered whether a city's posting of a notice forbidding
sales of liquors to a local resident constituted "such a stigma or
badge of disgrace that procedural due process require[d] notice
and an opportunity to be heard."84 The Court concluded it did and
rejected the city's procedural protections as insufficient.81 Roth
also suggested that reputational injury might suffice to state a
claim. Its new formulation of procedural due process led it to re-
ject the plaintiff university professor's wrongful dismissal
claims.85 But the Court stated in dicta that it would have faced "a
different case" had the state made "charge[s] against [the plain-
tiff] that might seriously damage his standing and associations in
his community" or "imposed on [the plaintiff] a stigma . . . that
foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities."87
These precedents reflect the shifting sands of the Court's ap-
proach to procedural due process. 88 As a pre-Roth case,
Constantineau reflected the Court's earlier and more flexible
approach to what interests qualified for procedural due process
protection.89 Roth, meanwhile, represented an intermediate point.
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v McGrath, 341 US 123, 124-25, 139 (1951) (Burton)
(plurality) (finding, in a splintered opinion, that the US attorney general's classification
of organizations as "Communist" was impermissible without sufficient factual basis and
constituted defamation). For cases closer in time to Davis, see Wisconsin v
Constantineau, 400 US 433, 437 (1971); Roth, 408 US at 573-74.
81 Davis, US 424 at 701.
82 See Parts I.B-C.
83 400 US 433 (1971).
84 Id at 434-36.
85 Id at 437, 439.
86 See notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
87 Roth, 408 US at 573-74. The Court cited a long chain of precedents for these con-
clusions, including Constantineau.
88 See Part I.B.
89 See note 39.
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While it required plaintiffs to point to an underlying right in order
to invoke due process protections, it did not require that the right
derive from an explicit entitlement.90 Deploying the same logic as
Meachum, Davis took this discipline a step further.
2. Davis and the stigma-plus claim.
Davis concerned a police department's distribution of a list of
"active shoplifters" to local merchants.,, Despite the fact that he
had not been found guilty of the alleged offense, the plaintiffs
name and photograph appeared on the list.92 The plaintiffs super-
visor questioned him about the incident, although he was not
fired.93 The plaintiff brought suit under § 1983, contending that
the stigma generated by the list prevented him from patronizing
the stores and limited his future employment opportunities.9 The
Court classified these claims as based only on an interest in rep-
utation. Drawing on its recently minted underlying-rights ap-
proach to procedural due process, the Court concluded that the
plaintiff had not pleaded a liberty interest that merited due pro-
cess protection.95 According to the Court, the plaintiff sought to
vindicate an interest in reputation.96 But the interest in enjoy-
ment of a good reputation, alone, was neither enshrined in the
Constitution nor "recognized and protected by state law."97 The
state could protect a person's reputation from injury using its tort
law, but state tort law was not (yet) a source of liberty interests.98
Perhaps as a result of the line of precedents acknowledging
reputational injuries,99 the Court in Davis did not bar recovery for
reputational injury altogether. Instead, it concluded that "repu-
tation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as em-
ployment," fell short of "either 'liberty' or 'property' by itself suffi-
cient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process
90 See text accompanying notes 38-48.
91 Davis, 424 US at 694-95.
92 See id at 695-96. After the plaintiff had pleaded not guilty to the underlying charge,
the charge had been filed away with leave to reinstate and remained outstanding. Id.
93 See id at 696.
94 Id at 694-96.
95 Davis, 424 US at 700-01, 711-12. See also Part I.B.
96 Davis, 424 US at 711-12.
97 Id at 700-01, 710.
98 Id at 712.
99 See text accompanying notes 83-87.
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Clause."100 The Court distinguished Davis from its prior cases con-
cerning reputational injury by identifying the earlier cases as in-
stances in which plaintiffs experienced both an alteration of legal
status and an injury resulting from defamation, thus justifying
procedural protection.101
Federal circuit courts formulated this holding into the two-
part stigma-plus test.1 02 Prospective plaintiffs must plead both
(1) a stigma, that is, that a false and injurious statement has been
made;103 and (2) a plus factor, that is, that the plaintiff suffered "a
material state-imposed burden or state-imposed alteration of the
plaintiffs status or rights."104
The Supreme Court has had few occasions to revisit its con-
clusion in Davis or the peculiarities of the stigma-plus test.105 It
has fallen instead to the circuit courts to resolve doctrinal ques-
tions. Notably, the circuits agree that the plus need not itself rise
to the level of an independent violation of state or federal law.106
It is enough that the factor constitutes a burden or alteration of
rights.
Commentators have been sharply critical of the Davis deci-
sion on both substantive and precedential grounds. Substantive
100 Davis, 424 US at 701.
101 Id at 708-10.
102 See, for example, Evans v Chalmers, 703 F3d 636, 654 (4th Cir 2012); Guttman v
Khalsa, 669 F3d 1101, 1125-26 (10th Cir 2012); San Jacinto Savings & Loan v Kacal, 928 F2d
697, 701 (5th Cir 1991); Somerset House, Inc v Turnock, 900 F2d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir 1990).
103 See Codd v Velger, 429 US 624, 638 n 11 (1977). See also Hill v Borough of Kutztown,
455 F3d 225, 236 (3d Cir 2006); Wenger v Monroe, 282 F3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir 2002).
104 Hill, 455 F3d at 236-37; Behrens v Regier, 422 F3d 1255, 1259-60 (11th Cir 2005);
Sadallah v City of Utica 383 F3d 34, 38 (2d Cir 2004). See also Siegert v Gilley, 500 US
226, 233-34 (1991) (discussing the required link between stigma and harm); Davis, 424
US at 701-02.
105 Codd briefly discusses the falsehood requirement but does not examine the claim
in any detail. See Codd, 429 US at 638 n 11. Siegert, for its part, rejected the suggestion
that malice amplified defamation into a stigma-plus claim cognizable as a Bivens action.
See Siegert, 500 US at 234.
106 See Dennis v S & S Consolidated Rural High School District, 577 F2d 338, 343
(5th Cir 1978) ("It is the individual's status as a government employee and not his property
interest in continued employment which furnishes the 'plus' that raises reputation to the
level of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.") (emphasis added). As the Third
Circuit explained in Hill, while the Supreme Court has never made this point explicitly,
it follows straightforwardly from its precedents. Hill, 455 F3d at 237-38. In addition to its
dicta in Roth, the Court has subsequently implicitly endorsed this conclusion. The Court
explained that it had "no doubt" that the Eighth Circuit was correct in concluding that a
stigma-plus plaintiff who lacked a property interest in continued employment was none-
theless deprived of liberty without due process of law when false accusations accompanied
his discharge. Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622, 633 n 13 (1980). See also Doe v
Department of Justice, 753 F2d 1092, 1104-12 (DC Cir 1985); Codd, 429 US at 627.
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critics argue that the decision has an unduly restrictive concept
of liberty.107 In addition to questioning whether the underlying-
rights approach is appropriate,108 critics note that after Davis the
Court at times embraced a more expansive conception of cogniza-
ble liberty interests.109 Others point out that reputational inter-
ests ought to qualify for procedural due process protection even
under the Court's underlying-rights analysis.11O Claims based on
reputational injury do have a basis in state law in the form of the
tort of defamation."' It was only by classifying the interest as the
right to enjoy a good reputation that the Court was able to classify
the Davis plaintiffs claim as outside the bounds of procedural due
process protection.
Other commentators are agnostic on the question whether
Davis was unduly restrictive, but take issue with its apparent in-
consistency with the Court's precedents. Professor Edward Rubin,
for example, points out that prior to Davis, there existed an "un-
broken line of cases . . . that had imposed due process require-
ments on government action when that action stigmatized a
person.""'
Thus, relying on a more appropriately expansive concept of
liberty, the state tort of defamation as a predicate underlying
107 See, for example, Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1077 (cited in note 20) ("[I]t seems incon-
ceivable that the Court would permit a state to establish an administrative scheme where
people were restrained and beaten simply because the state legislature declared that there
was no positive law right to avoid such treatment."); Mitnick, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 79,
90-98, 101-19 (cited in note 18) (claiming that stigma plus represents "impoverished con-
ceptions of reputation and liberty"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property,"
62 Cornell L Rev 405, 423-25 (1977). But see Ronald H. Surkin, The Status of the Private
Figure's Right to Protect His Reputation under the United States Constitution, 90 Dickin-
son L Rev 667, 678 (1986) (describing Davis as a solution to escape the "morass" of
"mak[ing] of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon what-
ever systems may already be administered by the States") (quotation marks omitted), cit-
ing Davis, 424 US at 701; Jeff Powell, Comment, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 Yale L J 1317, 1332-33 (1982) (complimenting Davis as an
example of using federalism concepts to "supply[ ] content to constitutional terms that lack
definition, such as 'liberty,' 'property,' and 'due process' instead of resorting to justices'
personal viewpoints).
108 See Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1077 (cited in note 20).
109 See id at 1074-75. See also note 56.
110 See Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 Wis L Rev 1203,
1219; Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 Va
L Rev 569, 579 (1999).
I1 See Armacost, 85 Va L Rev at 579 (cited in note 110).
112 Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1074-75 (cited in note 20). See also Part ID. 1. Some cases
appearing to recognize reputational harms even postdated Davis. See, for example, Vitek,
445 US at 491-92 (including protection from the stigmatizing effects of involuntary com-
mitment as one of the historic liberties protected by the Due Process Clause).
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right, or the Court's prior precedents, it is conceivable that the
Court could have recognized an independent liberty interest in
reputation after all. Nonetheless, the stigma-plus claim appears
to be a permanent, if peculiar, feature of procedural due process.
The stigma-plus claim, and its grounding in a shifting
Supreme Court doctrine, provokes a range of puzzles. It raises the
question how much deference Davis's focus on underlying liberty
interests should receive. It raises the question why the Court
paved any path for reputational injuries, and why the plus safe-
guard was erected as gatekeeper. And, most materially for pro-
spective litigants, it raises the question what kinds of injuries can
meet its demanding test-and which perpetrators can be held
responsible.
II. SOURCES OF STIGMA AND SOURCES OF HARM
Since Davis, courts have grappled with the stigma-plus test,
trying to formulate clear rules for what qualifies as a protected
interest under the doctrine and what relationship between the
two elements is required. For example, courts have examined
whether either evidence of a "connection between" the two ele-
ments13 or evidence of an "enhance[ment]" of the reputational
harm by the liberty interest infringementl4 qualifies under the
terms of the test. Similarly, they have investigated the required
temporal proximity betweenis and temporal order of116 the two
parts of the claim. And two circuits have grappled directly with
the question whether the elements must proceed from the same
source. The First Circuit has concluded that the same actor must
supply both elements for a stigma-plus claim to be adequately
pleaded. By contrast, the Second Circuit allows any state actor to
11 Marrero v City of Hialeah, 625 F2d 499, 502, 513, 519 (5th Cir 1980) (determining
plaintiffs did not need to show that the alleged reputational injury caused the alleged in-
fringement of a liberty interest but that a showing of "connection" with and "reasonabl[e]
relation]" between the two elements was sufficient).
114 McGhee v Draper, 639 F2d 639, 643 (10th Cir 1981) ("McGhee II") (allowing plain-
tiff untenured teacher to show that nonrenewal "caused or enhanced" alleged reputational
damage); McGhee v Draper, 564 F2d 902, 906-07 (10th Cir 1977) ("McGhee I").
115 See Brandt v Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 820 F2d 41, 45 (2d Cir
1987) (finding defamatory statements made at time of termination to qualify under the
stigma-plus test). See also Siegert v Gilley, 500 US 226, 233-34 (1991) (declining to find a
stigma-plus claim when "alleged defamation was not uttered incident to the termination
of [] employment," but offered "several weeks later").
116 See Martz v Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, 22 F3d 26, 32 (2d Cir 1994)
(finding defamatory comments that followed alleged deprivation of liberty or property in-
terest as failing to qualify under the stigma-plus test).
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supply the plus element. This Part describes and compares these
competing approaches.
A. The First Circuit: Stigma and Plus Must Proceed from the
Same Source
The First Circuit has taken the position that the stigma and
plus elements of a claim must proceed from the same governmen-
tal source. It developed its approach in two opinions, Hawkins v
Rhode Island Lottery Commission17 and URI Student Senate v
Town of Narragansett.118 In these opinions, the First Circuit ar-
ticulates concerns about state action and causation, and seeks to
avoid either problem by using a formalist approach that sharply
curtails prospective litigation to instances in which a single actor
issued the defamatory statements and inflicted the resulting in-
jury to a liberty interest.
In Hawkins, the plaintiff was terminated from his employ-
ment with the Rhode Island State Lottery Commission following
the state governor's bitter public criticism of his conduct in of-
fice.119 He sued the governor and the Lottery Commission using a
§ 1983 stigma-plus theory, arguing that the governor's public re-
marks criticizing his job performance amounted to defamation
and improperly caused the Lottery Commission to remove him
from his post.120 The First Circuit concluded that Hawkins had
"failed to state a viable due process claim" because "the party re-
sponsible for the alleged defamation was not the party responsi-
ble for the termination."121 The Lottery Commission was fiscally
and operationally autonomous and separate from the governor's
office.122 As such, "[a]lthough the governor's rhetoric may have
created a political climate antithetic[all to Hawkins [and] that af-
fected the Commission's deliberations, the governor neither spoke
for the Commission nor controlled its actions."123 Plaintiff's termi-
nation was not a ratification of the governor's defamatory state-
ments, but an independent action taken by an autonomous
agency.124
117 238 F3d 112 (1st Cir 2001).
118 631 F3d 1 (1st Cir 2011).
119 Hawkins, 238 F3d at 113.
120 Id at 115.
121 Id at 116.
122 Id.
123 Hawkins, 238 F3d at 116.
124 See id at 116.
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A decade later, the First Circuit underscored this approach.
In URI Student Senate, the defendant city had passed an ordi-
nance authorizing police officers to affix a sticker to any residence
deemed to have hosted an "unruly gathering."125 The plaintiffs,
representing both local college students and local landlords,
brought a § 1983 stigma-plus facial challenge to this practice, ar-
guing, respectively, that the practice exposed the students to dis-
ciplinary proceedings and that it impeded the landlords' ability to
find tenants. 126 The First Circuit rejected this claim on the
grounds that when "the stigma and the incremental harm-the
'plus' factor-derive from distinct sources, a party cannot make
out a viable procedural due process claim."127
The court's concerns included the absence of a state-
guaranteed right in either the landlords' or the students' claims
and the groups' failure to demonstrate sufficient state action.
There was no "right to rent and live in Narragansett free of public
branding."128 Nor were landlords entitled to have rental units fully
occupied.129 Moreover, "the vacancies that the [landlord] appel-
lants lament[ed] [did] not result from state action but, rather,
from the actions of third parties."130 It was "prospective tenants,
acting without government compulsion, who [had] decide[d]
whether or not to rent particular dwellings."131 The court dis-
missed the student plaintiffs' claimed rights on similar grounds,
suggesting they derived purely from private contracts. 132 None-
theless, the court insisted that the case was not decided by the
tenuous rights claims or the absence of state action. "[E]ven if
both sources [were] government entities," a party could not make
out a viable procedural due process claim when the stigma and
the incremental harm derived from distinct sources.1 33
The First Circuit has justified this approach in several ways.
In Hawkins, it cited political considerations. "[I]n the context of a
public clash between political opponents," the court was hesitant
125 URI Student Senate, 631 F3d at 5.
126 Id at 9-10.
127 Id at 10, citing Hawkins, 238 F3d at 112, 116.




132 URI Student Senate, 631 F3d at 11.
133 Id at 10, citing Hawkins, 238 F3d at 112, 116. The court may have wished to avoid
giving the impression that its legal conclusion applied only to the facts before it.
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to "exceed the established limits of constitutional claims of repu-
tation injury."134 Moreover, the Lottery Commission was fiscally
and operationally autonomous and subject to a tripartite appoint-
ing authority.135 As a result, "the governor neither spoke for the
Commission nor controlled its actions."136 In other cases the court
has focused on the nature of a plus injury to justify its approach.
A "change in rights or status" must be "directly attributable to the
challenged governmental action" to support a stigma-plus
claim.137 This showing could not be made when distinct sources
supplied the stigma and the plus.138 A second actor could not sup-
ply defamation "incident to" another actor's subsequent act.139
These arguments have not formally persuaded a peer circuit, but
they have influenced other courts in rejecting more attenuated
stigma-plus claims.140
B. The Second Circuit: "Perfect Parity" Is Not Required
In contrast, the Second Circuit disclaims a parity require-
ment. According to the Second Circuit, all that is necessary to
bring a stigma-plus claim is meeting the requirements that
"(1) the stigma and plus would, to a reasonable observer, appear
connected ... and (2) the actor imposing the plus adopted (explic-
itly or implicitly) those [stigmatizing] statements in doing so."141
Because it accepts multiple-actor stigma-plus claims, however,
the Second Circuit's approach raises more complicated questions,
including to which actor liability attaches and whether a private
actor could supply either element of the claim. This Part describes
the origins of the Second Circuit's test and addresses its approach
to the resulting complexities.
134 Hawkins, 238 F3d at 116.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 URI Student Senate, 631 F3d at 10, citing Pendleton v City of Haverhill, 156 F3d
57, 63 (1st Cir 1998).
138 URI Student Senate, 631 F3d at 10.
139 Pendleton, 156 F3d at 64, citing Siegert, 500 US at 234.
140 See, for example, Wesley v Campbell, 2010 WL 3120204, *7 (ED Ky) (rejecting a
stigma-plus claim by an unindicted arrestee for sexual abuse of a child pursuant to an
investigative report and a subsequent termination from school employment on the grounds
that the report and the termination came from two different governmental actors);
Tibbetts v Kulongoski, 567 F3d 529, 538-39 (9th Cir 2009) (rejecting a stigma-plus claim
with elements supplied by different governmental actors when the alleged stigma pre-
ceded the alleged plus by sixteen months, although on more lenient qualified immunity
grounds).
141 Velez v Levy, 401 F3d 75, 89 (2d Cir 2005).
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In Velez v Levy,142 the plaintiff alleged that several fellow
members of one of New York City's community school district
boards4s fabricated and disseminated charges that she had har-
assed and terrorized a school official and that the chancellor of
the city school district had removed her from her post "in retalia-
tion for her stated political views."14 She challenged her removal
on stigma-plus grounds, arguing it deprived her of a liberty inter-
est and resulted from her fellow board members' allegedly defam-
atory statements.45
The plaintiff claimed that her fellow board members had dis-
seminated to the chancellor and to local news outlets allegations
that she had sprinkled "'foul smelling' [ ]. . .'voodoo' powder" out-
side a school superintendent's office.146 The chancellor investi-
gated and, concluding that the plaintiffs alleged behavior was in-
appropriate and possibly criminal, removed the plaintiff from her
post.147 The plaintiff sought and won reinstatement to this po-
sition from the city's board of education, which rejected the
chancellor's investigation as incomplete, illogical, and unduly
politicized.148
Although the Second Circuit described cases in which the
same governmental actor was responsible for each element of the
stigma-plus claim as "typical," it concluded that "perfect parity in
the origin of both the 'stigma' and the 'plus' [was] not required to
state the infringement of a 'stigma-plus' liberty interest."149 The
Second Circuit argued that the stigma-plus claim required con-
sideration of whether the plaintiff had alleged a "sufficiently prox-
imate" connection between the two elements to state a claim.150
This connection could be shown through demonstrating both
(1) that "the stigma and plus would, to a reasonable observer, ap-
pear connected," such as "due to their order of occurrence . . . or
142 401 F3d 75 (2d Cir 2005).
143 At the time the events at issue took place, New York was divided into thirty-two
community school district boards composed of local elected officials. A citywide board com-
posed of members appointed by the borough presidents and the mayor oversaw and ad-
ministered the boards, including through appointment of the chancellor of the city school
district. See id at 79-81 & n 1.
144 See id at 80.
145 Id at 79-80.
146 Velez, 401 F3d at 79, 81-82.
147 Id at 82-83.
148 Id at 83.
149 Id at 89.
150 Velez, 401 F3d at 89.
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their origin," and (2) that "the actor imposing the plus adopted
(explicitly or implicitly) those statements in doing so."15'
To allocate liability to the appropriate actor, the Second
Circuit examined which of the various defendants were in a posi-
tion to provide the plaintiff with the predeprivation hearing re-
quired to afford her adequate procedural due process.15 2 Although
it does not follow that liability for stigma plus will always attach
to the actor responsible for the plus, it will often have that effect.
In this case, the court found that the chancellor was the only
actor in a position to order preremoval review or supply
postremoval remedies.53
While it provided some guidance for assigning liability, the
Velez court did not grapple directly with the other complexity that
multiple-actor stigma-plus claims generate: whether private ac-
tors may supply either element of the claim. Because state actors
supplied both elements of the stigma-plus claim alleged in Velez,
it did not present the Second Circuit with an opportunity to ad-
dress this question directly. But the court likely intended its opin-
ion to validate only stigma-plus claims brought against state ac-
tors. References throughout the opinion illustrate a focus on
governmental action.154 The circuit's basic formulation of a
stigma-plus claim describes the plus element as constituting a
"tangible and material state-imposed burden."15 The circuit's dis-
cussion of the stigma element in past single-actor stigma-plus
claims similarly focuses on state actors. 156
The Velez court justified its approach by mining other circuits
it viewed as reaching sympathetic conclusions.157 It discusses each
151 Id at 89.
152 See id at 93.
153 Id.
154 See, for example, Velez, 401 F3d at 89 ("When government actors defame a person
and ... deprive them of some tangible legal right or status, . . . a liberty interest may be
implicated, even though the 'stigma' and 'plus' were not imposed at precisely the same
time."); id at 89 n 12 (noting that the absence of state action may be a reason why "one or
more defendants whose actions collectively implicate a liberty interest may not be liable
for the deprivation of that liberty interest").
155 See id at 87; Sadallah v City of Utica, 383 F3d 34, 38 (2d Cir 2004); Doe v Depart-
ment of Public Safety, 271 F3d 38, 47 (2d Cir 2001).
156 See Sadallah, 383 F3d at 38 (referring to "government-imposed stigma").
157 The court also disputed the distance between its position and the First Circuit's.
It went so far as to suggest that the sufficient-connection test could reconcile its approach
with the First Circuit's. Velez, 401 F3d at 90, citing Hawkins, 238 F3d at 116. Specifically,
the Lottery Commission in Hawkins, "in its termination of the plaintiff, 'uttered no defam-
atory statements,' and instead specifically denied that its actions were an endorsement of
[the alleged] stigmatizing claims." Velez, 401 F3d at 90, quoting Hawkins, 238 F3d at 116.
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case in brief, but a full discussion of one example is illuminating.
In McGhee v Draper,158 the Tenth Circuit explained that a stigma-
plus claim involving multiple actors could entitle a plaintiff to a
name-clearing hearing.159 Although the Second Circuit did not dis-
cuss this complexity, the stigma alleged in the McGhee cases was
attributable to private actors. 160 McGhee concerned an untenured
school teacher who alleged that the school board discontinued her
contract in response to unfounded parent and student complaints
at school board meetings.161 The plaintiff claimed that the parents
and students supplied the requisite stigma by making their com-
plaints and that the school board itself supplied the accompany-
ing plus by terminating the plaintiff. According to the Tenth
Circuit, the school board's actions to terminate the plaintiff could
qualify as depriving the plaintiff of a liberty interest whether the
board "explicitly state[d] the stigmatizing factors" or "implicitly
ratif[ied] some other stigmatizing allegations."162 The burden on
the plaintiff was not onerous. She could state a claim by alleging
that a termination or other alleged plus factor "caused or en-
hanced" the "alleged reputational damage."163 Alternatively, she
could allege that "the reputational harm was entangled with some
more tangible interests."164 Or she could allege that the harm oc-
curred in "an atmosphere where the plaintiffs reputation [was]
at issue."165
The Second Circuit noted further support in other circuits. In
Bishop v Tice,166 the plaintiff safety engineer alleged stigma and
As such, it could be viewed as decided on the basis of the absence of an actual connection
between stigma and plus rather than on the basis of the relevant actors' identities. Velez,
401 F3d at 90, quoting Hawkins, 238 F3d at 116. URI Student Senate firmly rejected those
overtures, however, see 631 F3d at 10, citing Hawkins, 238 F3d at 112, 116, and other
opinions have explicitly emphasized the disagreement, see Mead v Independence
Association, 684 F3d 226, 234-35 (1st Cir 2012). But the Second Circuit could make a
similar argument about URI Student Senate, pointing to the role of private actors in sup-
plying the second element of the claim.
158 639 F2d 639 (10th Cir 1981) ("McGhee II").
159 Id at 643.
160 The full implications of private-actor cases like the McGhee cases are discussed in
Part III.A.2.
161 McGhee I, 564 F2d at 906-07. The teacher was accused of being an immoral "sex-
pot," of permitting a student to check out a book containing four-letter expletives, and of
changing student grades on report cards. Id.
162 McGhee II, 639 F3d at 643.
163 Id.
164 Id at 643 n 2 (quotation marks omitted).
165 Id.
166 622 F2d 349 (8th Cir 1980).
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plus elements attributable to two different actors.16 7 The Eighth
Circuit permitted the claim to proceed.16s The Second Circuit
treated this conclusion as supporting its contention that stigma
and plus could be supplied separately. 169 Similarly, Marrero v City
of Hialeah170 concerned an instance in which stigma and plus were
supplied by the same state actor, but the Fifth Circuit stated ex-
pansively that "it [was] sufficient that the defamation occur[ed]
in connection with, and [was] reasonably related to, the alteration
of the right or interest."171 And in Owen v City of Independence,172
the plaintiff city police chief alleged that the city council released
a stigmatizing report concerning his operation of the police de-
partment, after which the city manager discharged him.173 While
the Supreme Court disposed of the case on other grounds,174 it ap-
proved the lower court's conclusion that the petitioner was de-
prived of due process. Referring back to its holding in Davis, the
Court reasoned that "even if [the council's accusations] did not in
point of fact cause petitioner's discharge, the defamatory and stig-
matizing charges certainly occurred in the course of the termina-
tion of employment."175
Taken together, these examples illustrate a consistently con-
textual approach. Each court appears to permit claims involving
multiple actors or separate incidents so long as the plaintiff could
claim sufficient causal connection between the two elements. Ra-
ther than erect formal barriers between the stages of the stigma-
plus claim or which actors may supply them, they allow subse-
quent actions to "ratify"176 prior stigmatizing conduct. While not
dispositive of the question the Second Circuit considered, the
cases appear sympathetic to its conclusion.
167 Id at 353-54. The plaintiff alleged that he was stigmatized by Occupational Safety
and Health Administration auditors' demand, made in front of third parties, that the
plaintiff resign or face unspecified criminal charges. Id at 351-52. And the plaintiff ac-
cused his supervisor of supplying a plus by denying him either an explanation or any fur-
ther administrative remedy. Id at 352. The case was complicated somewhat by allegations
of collusion between the supervisor and the auditors. See id at 352, 354.
168 Id at 353-54.
169 Velez, 401 F3d at 88.
170 625 F2d 499 (5th Cir 1980).
171 Id at 519-20. See also Velez, 401 F3d at 88-89 (interpreting the Fifth Circuit's
holding).
172 445 US 622 (1980).
173 Id at 628-29.
174 The parties had not briefed the court on the liberty-interest question, and the
Supreme Court decided the case on qualified immunity grounds. Id at 633 n 13, 657.
175 Id at 633 n 13 (quotation marks omitted), citing Davis, 424 US at 710.
176 McGhee II, 639 F2d at 643.
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In sum, the First and Second Circuits vary along multiple di-
mensions. They disagree about whether an identity of actors is
necessary, and they appear to disagree about whether the plus
hurdle requires sharp rules or context-driven standards for eval-
uating whether stigma and plus are adequately linked. But both
approaches share reference back to the purpose the stigma-plus
test was designed to achieve: careful scrutiny of the causal link
between its elements.
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPROACH BEST ACCOMPLISHES THE
PURPOSE OF THE STIGMA-PLUS CLAIM
The varying approaches taken by the First and Second
Circuits exemplify the challenges of interpreting the stigma-plus
claim.177 Both circuits attempt to answer Davis's demand for close
scrutiny of stigma-plus claims. But without a strong theory ex-
plaining the purpose of a stigma-plus claim, they trade assertions
as to what tests and outcomes it requires. This Part fills this gap
through a two-part argument. In Part III.A, it considers what
purpose the stigma-plus claim serves. It frames this question by
examining alternative design choices made in other hurdles to
civil litigation. It ultimately concludes that the stigma-plus hur-
dle represents a causation test. In Part III.B, it examines the cir-
cuits' competing approaches to determine which is best suited to
scrutinizing the causal link between stigma and harm.
A. Deriving the Purpose of the Stigma-Plus Claim
Existing literature on Davis and the stigma-plus claim pre-
sents a straightforward hypothesis about its source: to disapprove
of ballooning litigation dockets in the federal courts by placing a
damper on claims, with a particular focus on discouraging seem-
ingly tenuous claims like those predicated on reputational
harm.178 There is some evidence to support this hostility hypothe-
sis. The decision is time-stamped at a contentious moment in the
development of procedural due process and federal constitutional
177 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev
1479, 1530-32 (1987) (discussing courts' expanding role in interpreting § 1983).
178 See, for example, Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 7-8 (cited in note 69); Mitnick, 43
UC Davis L Rev at 90-93 (cited in note 18); Rubin, 72 Cal L Rev at 1111 (cited in note 20)
(describing the Court's concern as "essentially a 'floodgates of litigation' problem").
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torts17 9 and goes out of its way to break new ground.180 Also,
stigma plus was one of a spate of contemporaneous retrenching
moves the Court deployed to scale back the scope of
constitutional-tort liability.181 The Court may have hoped to re-
duce strain on the federal docket or to eliminate redundancies be-
tween federal claims and state causes of action.182 Perhaps there
is something about reputation-based claims that makes this re-
dundancy especially troubling.183
However, the hypothesis that the stigma-plus claim was mo-
tivated by hostility to federal litigation proves too little. Even if
the claim needs no internal logic, stopping the analysis there pro-
vides no insight into its chosen form and provides little guidance
regarding novel applications of the claim.
Such an explanation also proves incorrect. While the stigma-
plus claim emerged from a skeptical Court, a focus on what it pro-
hibited fails to account for what it enabled. It is a claim founded
on the conclusion that reputation is not a protected liberty inter-
est, but it also lends reputational harm the power to amplify the
infringement of some other protected interest into a new or
strengthened claim. The claim's design thus disapproves reputa-
tion as a liberty interest while in the next breath affording it a
powerful role. If the first half of this doublespeak motivates the
hostility hypothesis, the second half illustrates that courts were
more preoccupied by the potential harm represented by reputa-
tional injury than they have let on.
This Section presents a more compelling story capable of
knitting together this apparent contradiction. The stigma-plus
claim represents a beefed-up check on the claimed causal link be-
tween stigma and harm. The Section reaches this conclusion by
first examining alternate design choices and then considering al-
ternate applications of the stigma-plus claim.
179 See Part L
180 Whether reputation-based interests may support a procedural due process claim
as a normative or constitutional matter, Davis has been criticized as an unconvincing
treatment of past precedents and a doctrinal eddy. See notes 107-12. See also Mark
Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name: An Examination of the Scholar-
ship of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 64 Ky L J 753, 753, 758-63 (1976) (criticizing the Court's
efforts to distinguish its precedents).
181 See note 78.
182 For a version of this argument, see Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 7-10 (cited in note 69).
183 For one argument that reputation is an unusual interest, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Hard Defamation Cases, 25 Wrm & Mary L Rev 891, 891 (1984) (discussing the inherent
tension between free expression and the interest in reputation).
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1. Analogs elsewhere in civil rights law.
Elsewhere in civil rights law and civil litigation, courts have
made three different design choices in carving out hurdles to
claims: (a) general claims bars, (b) heightened evidentiary re-
quirements, and (c) heightened pleadings requirements. The
stigma-plus claim belongs to the third category, but examples
from all three illuminate what it was designed-and not de-
signed-to achieve.
a) General claims bars. General rules barring wide swaths
of cases take several forms. For one, courts may limit claims based
on class membership. The Supreme Court has, for example, de-
clined to recognize the poor as a protected class under the Equal
Protection Clause.184 As a result, taxpayers were barred from
challenging inequitable school financing on the basis of their
wealth status.185 Courts have also erected various immunity for-
mulas.186 For example, public officials performing judicial,187 leg-
islative,188 and prosecutorial189 functions enjoy absolute immunity
from suit for monetary damages.190
Such bars are counterpoints to stigma plus in two respects.
First, stigma plus targets a particular type of injury. By contrast,
the claims bars described above either foreclose causes of action
entirely on the basis of the plaintiffs or the defendant's identity
or present global hurdles for plaintiffs in federal court. Second,
stigma plus paves a path forward for reputational harm rather
than excluding it as a basis for recovery. The Court could have
crafted a general rule raising the bar for all procedural due
process claims, or it could have barred reputation-based claims
184 See San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 29 (1973).
185 Id. Many turned to state legislatures, which designed their own wealth-
equalization formulas, with mixed results. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 Va L Rev 1963, 1971-73 (2008). Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court's refusal to officially designate LGBTQ status a suspect class has
not foreclosed securing rights for LGBTQ persons. See, for example, Obergefell v Hodges,
135 S Ct 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (finding that bans on same-sex marriage violate the funda-
mental right to marry); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4, 78 (1996) (describing the Court's approach
to anti-gay legislation as "rationality review 'with bite').
186 See Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 6-7 & nn 11-19 (cited in note 69).
187 See Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547, 554 (1967).
188 See Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 379 (1951); Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US
44, 48-57 (1998).
189 See Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 422-29 (1976).
190 Officers performing other functions are entitled to good-faith or qualified immun-




altogether. Yet it did neither. This design choice suggests that the
Court viewed reputational injury as worthy of scrutiny-in the
right circumstances.
b) Heightened evidentiary requirements. Evidentiary re-
quirements structure the ways in which plaintiffs may prove their
claims. They typically require a precise dialogue between plain-
tiffs and defendants. For example, McDonnell-Douglas Corp v
Green'91 provides for a burden-shifting framework that specifies a
precise multistep analysis for evaluating an employment discrim-
ination claim under Title VII: (1) the plaintiff must make out a
prima facie case of discrimination, (2) the defendant must show a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for action, and (3) the plain-
tiff must demonstrate that that legitimate reason was in fact
pretext.1 92
Like stigma plus, heightened evidentiary requirements raise
the proof standards faced by prospective litigants and hinge on
interpretation of terms within common-law frameworks. But they
also differ from stigma plus, facing plaintiffs at a later phase of
litigation. Stigma plus may impede a plaintiff from stating a plau-
sible claim for which relief may be granted at the motion-to-
dismiss stage.193 As in Davis194 and Velez,195 plaintiffs may be ex-
cluded from federal court on the basis of their pleadings.196 By
contrast, evidentiary requirements like the steps of the
McDonnell-Douglas framework typically exclude plaintiffs at
summary judgment.197 Consequently, plaintiffs facing evidentiary
hurdles have surer access to the discovery process-an undenia-
ble advantage. Access to discovery may in itself be a goal of civil
rights litigation for its capacity to shed light on potentially dis-
criminatory or unlawful practices.198 Moreover, discovery may
lessen the information imbalance between civil rights plaintiffs
and defendants, the latter of whom likely have access to details
191 411 US 792 (1973).
192 See id at 802-05.
193 See FRCP 12(b)(6).
194 Davis, 424 US at 696.
195 Velez, 401 US at 80.
196 As with most pleadings hurdles, however, stigma-plus plaintiffs may also lose
stigma-plus claims at the summary judgment stage. See, for example, URIStudent Senate,
631 F3d at 7.
197 See FRCP 56.
198 Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litiga-
tion, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev 157, 171 (2010) (describing discovery as an "end in itself" in
some civil rights litigation and civil rights plaintiffs as private attorneys general in some
of their litigation endeavors).
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about the termination decision or other pertinent actions.199 This
is not to suggest that discovery is an unassailable boon to the lit-
igation process, 200 but to illustrate that the stigma-plus hurdle is
unusual in framing and in stringency.
The "pretext-plus" requirement that several circuits,01 in-
cluding the First,202 have adopted in employment discrimination
cases is an example of a heightened evidentiary requirement. Un-
der this requirement, plaintiffs responding to defendants' claimed
nondiscriminatory reasons for taking adverse employment ac-
tions must demonstrate both that the claimed reason was false
and that evidence external to the prima facie case of discrimina-
tory treatment showed the defendant's discriminatory intent.203
This requirement structures the plaintiffs burden of persuasion,
guiding how plaintiffs may prove-rather than plead-their
claims.204
"Animus plus" plays a similar role. In mixed-motive employ-
ment discrimination cases, 205 it requires that employees prove
causation by offering evidence that both "reflects directly the al-
leged discriminatory animus" and "bears squarely on the con-
tested employment decision."206 This approach and its variants,
adopted at various times by, among others, the First,207 Fifth,208
and DC209 Circuits, represents an "attempt[] to weed out stray
remarks from probative evidence of discrimination by focusing on
199 Id at 168, 171; Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 849, 873-74 (2010). See also Rakesh
N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading,
62 Stan L Rev 905, 927 (2010) (naming this conundrum a "paradox of pleading").
200 As Judge Frank Easterbrook (along with others) have argued, discovery has consid-
erable social costs. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 BU L Rev 635, 637-38
(1989). For example, the costs of responding to a discovery request may outweigh the social
value of the information. Id. Alternatively, litigants may file burdensome requests to bring
their adversary to the settlement table-not because the requested information is useful. Id.
201 See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy
of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 Hastings L J 57, 83 &
nn 94-96 (1991).
202 See, for example, White v Vathally, 732 F2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir 1984).
203 Id. See also Lanctot, 43 Hastings L J at 81-91 (cited in note 201).
204 White, 732 F2d at 1043.
205 See Ezra S. Greenberg, Note, Stray Remarks and Mixed-Motive Cases after Desert
Palace v. Costa: A Proximity Test for Determining Minimal Causation, 29 Cardozo L Rev
1795, 1796 (2008) (defining mixed-motive employment discrimination cases as those
"based in part on a nondiscriminatory reason and in part on a discriminatory reason").
206 Id at 1818-19.
207 Febres v Challenger Caribbean Corp, 214 F3d 57, 60 (1st Cir 2000).
208 Brown v CSC Logic, Inc, 82 F3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir 1996).
209 Thomas v National Football League Players Association, 131 F3d 198, 204 (DC
Cir 1997).
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whether there is a causal link between the employer's discrimi-
natory animus and the employment decision."210 Courts have gen-
erally deployed the animus-plus standard as an evidentiary hur-
dle at the summary judgment211 or trial212 stages.
These hurdles share the broad goals of the stigma-plus claim
in sorting likely from unlikely causal connections. Yet they differ
in their generalized demand only for additional evidence, some in
more precise forms than others. By contrast, the stigma-plus test
will accept only one form of additional evidence as proof of the
underlying claim: specific allegations that the plaintiff was de-
prived of another property or liberty interest.
c) Heightened pleading requirements. Pleadings hurdles
differ from evidentiary hurdles in that they scrutinize only the
facial sufficiency of the complaint.213 The most familiar pleadings
requirement is the motion-to-dismiss standard applicable in fed-
eral court. 14 But there are also unique pleadings hurdles that ap-
ply to specific claims.
The general motion-to-dismiss standard, prescribed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that civil plaintiffs in
federal court plead sufficient factual detail for courts to conclude
their claims are facially plausible.215 While the pleadings stand-
ard is typically applied to motions to dismiss,216 defendants may
invoke the same standard in support of judgment on the pleadings
provided that it does not delay trial.217 Commentators have pre-
dicted that21s (but contested whether)219 these hurdles will have
an outsized effect on civil rights claims.
210 Greenberg, Note, 29 Cardozo L Rev at 1819 (cited in note 205).
211 See Brown, 83 F3d at 656-57 (evaluating the sufficiency of evidence introduced in
support of motions for summary judgment).
212 See Febres, 214 F3d at 60-61 (evaluating the sufficiency of evidence introduced at
trial).
213 See Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 678 (2009).
214 See id at 678-80; Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 556-57, 570 (2007).
215 See Iqbal, 556 US at 678-80; Twombly, 550 US at 556-57.
216 See FRCP 12(b)(6).
217 See FRCP 12(c). See also Frappier v Countrywide Loans, Inc, 750 F3d 91, 96 (1st
Cir 2014) (applying the Rule 12(b)(6) motion-to-dismiss standard to a Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings).
218 Wasserman, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 167-74 (cited in note 198) (detailing the
"substance-procedure mismatch" between civil rights litigation and the plausibility plead-
ing standard articulated in Iqbal).
219 Compare Joe S. Cecil, et al, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after
Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules *9, 14 (Federal
Judicial Center, Mar 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/PS98-NW6D (noting consistently
low rates of dismissal for failure to state a claim before and after Iqbal), with Raymond H.
Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and
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Courts have also constructed pleadings hurdles unique to
specific claims, like stigma plus, using the common law.220 The
civil-disabilities test for petitions for a writ of coram nobis is an
example. Petitions for coram nobis provide an avenue for persons
no longer in federal custody to seek collateral relief for unconsti-
tutional or unlawful convictions.221 The federal habeas corpus
statute 222 provides for relief only for defendants in federal custody.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has affirmed the availability of
"the extraordinary writ of coram nobis" as a common-law remedy
to cure "errors of the most fundamental character" when no other
remedy is available and there were sound reasons the former de-
tainee failed to seek earlier relief.223 It is an attractive avenue of
relief for former convicts facing the collateral consequences of con-
viction.224 Some federal courts have required that claimants show
that "the judgment of conviction produce [d] lingering civil disabil-
ities" in order to seek review of their convictions.225 Claimants
must also plead that those disabilities were "unique to criminal
convictions,"226 while mere reputational harms or the pure "satis-
faction of having [one's] position vindicated" fall short.227 This test
serves as a substitute for the custody requirement in an ordinary
habeas corpus claim.228 The civil-disabilities test marks a partic-
ularly interesting comparison with stigma plus because both
Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 Ky L J 235, 260-62 (2012) (noting an increase in
motions to dismiss challenging pleadings sufficiency and an increase in dismissal rates in
housing and employment discrimination cases). See also William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh
Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U Chi L Rev 693, 748-50 (2016) (suggesting that other
constraints on litigant behavior may prove more significant than the reworked pleading
standard).
220 Some scholars have questioned the importance of variation between pleadings
hurdles on the grounds that the main determinant of success is strength of the case rather
than the standard of pleading. See Hubbard, 83 U Chi L Rev at 701-06 (cited in note 219).
Even if this is so, the variation still has real-world effects: the stigma-plus test and the
examples given here require not only that a case be strong, but also that its strength be
pleaded in a specific way.
221 See Telink v United States, 24 F3d 42, 45 (9th Cir 1994).
222 28 USC § 2255.
223 United States v Morgan, 346 US 502, 512-13 (1954) (quotation marks omitted).
224 These collateral consequences include ineligibility for naturalization or military ser-
vice, restrictions on political service, and heightened sentences under recidivism statutes.
See Note, The Need for Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts, 59 Yale L J 786, 786-87 (1950).
225 United States v Keane, 852 F2d 199, 203 (7th Cir 1988).
226 Id. Examples of the types of disabilities considered include loss of the right to vote,
loss of occupational licenses, or a loss of the right to bear arms, but exclude financial pen-
alties or civil disabilities.
227 Id at 204.
228 See United States v Bush, 888 F2d 1145, 1146, 1148 (7th Cir 1989).
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reject reputational harms as predicate injury, potentially under-
scoring courts' ambivalence about or uncertainty toward the ex-
tent to which reputational injury is separately cognizable as
harm.
Courts' dislike of seemingly tenuous harms, including repu-
tational injury, has led them to erect varied hurdles to recovery.
Which hurdle applies to a given context illuminates the designing
court's view of the underlying claim. When courts design hurdles
that do not preclude claims altogether, they convey ambivalence,
settling on a middle ground between recognizing the particular
claim and scrutinizing whether it has a strong basis. For example,
the evidentiary hurdles described above require specific evidence
illustrating a link between the claimed harm and the impermis-
sible reason for its occurrence. 229 If plaintiffs can establish the
purported causal link between the impermissible motive and the
adverse action, courts deploying these tests wish to allow them to
proceed.
By contrast, other hurdles are designed to prompt plaintiffs
to plead different types of claims altogether. For example, general
claims bars keep disfavored claims out of court. More subtly, bar-
riers like the coram nobis civil-disabilities test steer plaintiffs
from pleading impermissible claims (based on reputation) to per-
missible ones (based on specific harms).
Stigma plus unites elements of each type of hurdle: it declines
to foreclose pleading reputational claims but requires a compara-
tively higher evidentiary bar to succeed on such claims. At the
same time, stigma plus is less open ended than evidentiary hur-
dles, which require only that plaintiffs provide more evidence of
their underlying claims and do not restrict the types of evidence
plaintiffs may use. Stigma plus demands pleading that an alto-
gether separate liberty interest was infringed. But unlike the
civil-disabilities test, stigma plus paves a path forward for
reputation-based injuries. It serves not to exclude reputation-
based injuries from federal court, but to ensure that only those
reputation-based injuries that cause infringements of further lib-
erty or property interests may proceed.
229 See text accompanying notes 202-11.
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These details suggest that the stigma-plus claim is best read
as a causation test requiring close and specific scrutiny of the pur-
ported link between the two elements it retains. It resembles
pleadings hurdles in that it makes very specific demands of pro-
spective plaintiffs. But it also shares features of evidentiary hur-
dles in that it preserves an avenue to sort out which claims
demonstrate the required link between the elements.
2. Analogs elsewhere in stigma-plus law.
The wide universe of successful stigma-plus claims further
illuminates the purpose of the hurdle and sheds light on the ex-
tent to which privately supplied elements may complete the
claim. As a preliminary matter, other circuits have taken sympa-
thetic approaches to stigma-plus claims perpetrated by multiple
actors.23 0 Further, other circuits have proven willing to consider
stigma-plus claims predicated on a looser concept than the First
Circuit's strict parity. This Section considers two possible exam-
ples of more complex stigma-plus claims: claims in which a pri-
vate actor supplies the underlying stigma and claims in which a
private actor supplies the subsequent plus. These possible claims
offer the attraction of deterring harmful behavior. But they also
encounter the apparent pitfall of the state-action requirement un-
derlying all procedural due process claims.231
Under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove that they were deprived
of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.232 For
purposes of this analysis, any governmental entity generally
qualifies as a state actor. 233 But a nongovernmental entity may
230 See, for example, McGhee II, 639 F2d at 643 (finding a potential liberty depriva-
tion when a number of parents and students made stigmatizing statements against the
plaintiff teacher at school board meetings and the defendant school board proceeded to
terminate the plaintiff); Bishop, 622 F2d at 352-54 (finding a valid claim for deprivation
of plaintiff's liberty interest when two defendants made stigmatizing statements at the
direction of a third, and the third defendant denied the plaintiff access to administrative
remedies); Marrero, 625 F2d at 519-20 (holding that, when stigma and plus were imposed
by the same actors, "the defamatory communication need not cause the loss of the pro-
tected right, or more tangible interest, in order to satisfy the stigma-plus requirement"
because "it is sufficient that the defamation occur in connection with, and be reasonably
related to, the alteration of the right or interest"). See also Part I.B.
231 See notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
232 See id. This analysis is generally parallel under § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co, 457 US 922, 935 n 18 (1982).
233 See John Dorsett Niles, Lauren E. Tribble, and Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Making
Sense of State Action, 51 SC L Rev 885, 901-04, 908-09 (2011). State officials may still be
considered public actors if they act in a private capacity or if they engage in an abuse of
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also qualify as a state actor if it was acting in a public capacity234
or if the state was sufficiently supportive to make the private con-
duct fairly attributable to the state.25
In a single-actor stigma-plus suit, the inquiry into whether
the defendant acted under color of state law will be relatively
straightforward. The question will be only whether the responsi-
ble actor qualifies as governmental in form, function, or fair at-
tribution. When different actors generate each element, however,
the analysis becomes more complicated. The same analysis must
be performed twice, assessing where each actor's identity falls on
the spectrum from private to public. If one actor is a state actor
and the other is not, the relationship between the two actors must
be dissected to uncover whether the private conduct of one is at-
tributable to the other. Federal courts reviewing these claims
have not openly wrestled with this complexity. But their ap-
proaches may be classified roughly in terms of stigma-plus claims
in which a private actor supplied the stigma and those in which a
private actor supplied the plus.
The McGhee cases illustrate an example of private actors sup-
plying the stigma that motivates a public plus. Although the
Second Circuit treated the case as supporting its position,26 the
McGhee cases concerned a more tenuous stigma-plus claim. The
stigmatizing comments that motivated the defendant school
board to terminate the plaintiff school teacher were made by pri-
vate actors speaking at school board meetings, not public offi-
cials.237 The Tenth Circuit did not evaluate any possible state-
action concerns. These concerns may have been allayed by the
presence of a state defendant or the fact that the nonrenewal
served to "ratify" stigmatizing allegations about the plaintiff.238
The Tenth Circuit also could have reasoned that the stigma was
fairly attributable to the school board because it provided the fo-
rum for the hearings. Or it may simply have concluded that the
importance of the interest in reputation permitted a finding of
their authority. See Lebron v National Railroad Passenger Corp, 513 US 374, 378 (1995)
(treating Amtrak as a public entity).
234 See Niles, Tribble, and Wimsatt, 51 SC L Rev at 904-08 (cited in note 233). See
also Flagg Brothers, Inc v Brooks, 436 US 149, 161-63 (1978); Terry v Adams, 345 US 461,
466 (1953).
235 See Niles, Tribble, and Wimsatt, 51 SC L Rev at 910-26 (cited in note 233). See
also Blum v Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 1012 (1982); Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co, 419
US 345, 350 (1974).
236 Velez, 401 F3d at 89.
237 McGhee v Draper, 564 F2d 902, 906)7 (10th Cir 1977) ("McGhee I").
238 McGhee II, 639 F2d at 643.
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stigma plus irrespective of the actors' identities, provided suffi-
cient causal connection could be shown.
There are not many obvious examples of state-action chal-
lenges with the opposite formulation of state stigma and private
plus. To the contrary, the Second Circuit's formulation of the
stigma-plus claim appears to reject a private plus altogether by
requiring that the plaintiff prove an "additional state-imposed
burden" as the plus element of the claim.239 Similarly, the First
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' claims in URI Student Senate in
part because the plus the plaintiffs pleaded was supplied by pri-
vate actors. 240
The closest analogy may be stigma-plus claims arising from
sex-offender registration requirements. A number of courts have
permitted plaintiffs to proceed on this theory. For example, in
Gwinn v Awmiller,241 the plaintiff argued that he had been erro-
neously classified as a sex offender and subsequently subjected to
various procedural due process harms, including receiving no no-
tice that registration as a sex offender was a condition of his su-
pervised release.242 The court found that no further deprivation of
state or federal rights was necessary in order for the plaintiffs
liberty interest to be implicated.243 Numerous circuits have
reached the same conclusion.244 The plaintiff in Gwinn appears to
have taken care to plead a plus element attributable to govern-
ment. Nonetheless, the underlying harm the plaintiff identified
appears more expansive. An absence of notice or other procedural
protections is an element of all stigma-plus claims. It is rather
either the fact of registration itself or the resulting harms that
likely generated the complaint. According to the plaintiff in
Gwinn, these costs included limitations on employment and ad-
mission to substance abuse programs. 245 In Valmonte v Bane,246
239 See Velez, 401 F3d at 87; Sadallah v City of Utica, 383 F3d 34, 38 (2d Cir 2004);
Doe v Department of Public Safety, 271 F3d 38, 47 (2d Cir 2001). As discussed in note 156,
the circuit uses similar terms to describe the stigma element.
240 URI Student Senate, 631 F3d at 10. See also text accompanying notes 128-32.
241 354 F3d 1211 (10th Cir 2004).
242 Id at 1216, 1222-23.
243 See id at 1216, 1223-24.
244 See, for example, Doe, 271 F3d at 47-59, revd on other grounds, 538 US 1 (2003).
But see Russell v Gregoire, 124 F3d 1079, 1083, 1089 (9th Cir 1997) (rejecting the claim
that Washington state's sex-offender-registration statute implicated a liberty interest suf-
ficient to bring a § 1983 stigma-plus claim on the basis that the statute was regulatory
rather than punitive).
245 See Gwinn, 354 F3d at 1221-22.
246 18 F3d 992 (2d Cir 1994).
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the Second Circuit confronted this concern directly. It found that
a registry "[did] not simply defame" the plaintiff.247 Rather, "it
place[d] a tangible burden on her employment prospects" in the
private childcare field, in part because childcare employers were
required by statute to consult the registry. 248
Like the McGhee cases, these cases do not illustrate the oper-
ation of a purely private plus element. In Valmonte, the state's
requirement that employers consult the registry did the work of
dispensing the harm; any private action was purely speculative.49
Even in a subsequent case predicated on a private actor's proac-
tive consultation of a sex-offender registry, the plaintiff could
likely argue that such use of the registry was "fairly attributable"
to the state via its registration requirement.2o Given that the pur-
pose of many sex-offender registries is to compel public availabil-
ity of this information, private and public actors seem to work to-
gether to dispense most plausible harms.
Taken together, the circuits' experimentation with private ac-
tors yields several insights. First, multiple pathways could ex-
plain the result each court reached. No court affirms the inde-
pendent sufficiency of a privately supplied element. But the cases
also suggest that the use of a distinction between private and pub-
lic actors to sort qualifying deprivations of liberty interests (such
as loss or impairment of state employment2i or foreclosure of a
right to be considered for government contracts252) from disquali-
fying deprivations of liberty interests (such as notices impinging
on landlords' options for renting their properties)253 is unhelpful.
None of the courts dwells at length on the state-action require-
ment or insist on a formal quantum of state involvement. As a
practical matter, courts are unlikely to find that state action was
247 Id at 1001. See also Dupuy v Samuels, 397 F3d 493, 511 (7th Cir 2005) (noting
agreement with the Second Circuit on this point).
248 Valmonte, 18 F3d at 1001. Similarly, in Doe, the Second Circuit had emphasized
the onerous duties the state registration law imposed. See Doe, 271 F3d at 57.
249 See Valmonte, 18 F3d at 1001.
250 See Blum, 457 US at 1012.
251 See Cannon v City of West Palm Beach, 250 F3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir 2001); Donato
v Plainview-Old Bethpage Centennial School District, 96 F3d 623, 630-31 (2d Cir 1996);
Martz v Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, 22 F3d 26, 31 (2d Cir 1994); Mosrie v Barry,
718 F2d 1151, 1161-62 (DC Cir 1983). See also Davis, 424 US at 701 ("[This line of cases
does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible
interest such as employment, is either 'liberty' or 'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the
procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.") (emphasis added).
252 See Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc v Secretary of Defense, 631 F2d 953, 955-
56, 964 (DC Cir 1980).
253 See URI Student Senate, 631 F3d at 10.
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supplied by a purely private actor whose conduct is not intuitively
attributable to a state actor. But the courts' inquiry appears to
rest less on the identity of the individual actor standing alone and
more on the interaction of the two elements of the stigma-plus
claim. As above, this approach points toward a focus on the causal
relationship between the underlying stigma and accompanying
plus.
B. Vindicating the Purpose of the Stigma-Plus Claim
Part III.A. 1 concludes that the stigma-plus test is better read
as a test for causation than as a means to express disfavor or hos-
tility toward reputation-based claims. But it also supports the
conclusion that skepticism toward the claim is doing some work
in the background, pushing the hurdle to an unusual height.
Part III.A.2 lends further support to the causation reading by il-
lustrating how courts have applied the test to causally complex
situations. Determining that the stigma-plus test is a causation
test does not, however, immediately clarify which circuit has the
better approach.
Both circuits' approaches to the multiple-actor problem can
be defended as responding to concerns regarding causation. The
First Circuit frames the same-actor requirement as aiding deter-
minations whether or not a defamatory statement was "incident
to" deprivation of a liberty interest.24 The Second Circuit is even
more pronounced, directly invoking proximate cause.255 But the
circuits employ different tools toward this end. While the Second
Circuit invokes a flexible standard designed to parse the details,
investigating whether a second actor's behavior was caused by the
first in a fact-specific inquiry, the First Circuit appears convinced
that a rule sharply delineating acceptable claims is the best way
to vindicate the skeptical posture of the plus hurdle.
This Section weighs these competing approaches as a means
of evaluating causation. It concludes that the Second Circuit's ap-
proach better achieves this end. By requiring courts to evaluate
deterrence contextually, the Second Circuit ensures that each
component of the stigma-plus claim has independent force. Such
an approach better captures the liberty interest this cause of ac-
tion is designed to protect and better deters state action designed
to infringe on that interest.
254 See Pendleton v City of Haverhill, 156 F3d 57, 63-64 (1st Cir 1998).
255 See Velez, 401 F3d at 89.
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1. Paradigms for evaluating causation.
Under black-letter law, the "standard definition" of proxi-
mate cause is "that cause which, in natural and continuous se-
quence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
It is the efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation
the factors that accomplish the injury."26 But those are "just
words,"257 and require difficult line-drawing enterprises to acquire
meaning. The First and Second Circuits' approaches can be
thought of as two different methods for achieving this end.
The First Circuit's sharp rule puts to rest uncertainty about
unusual causal pathways, minimizing court costs and errors by
excluding separate-actor claims as a class. An act to deprive some-
one of a recognized liberty interest is more likely to be proxi-
mately caused by that same actor's defamatory statement. By
contrast, if separate actors are responsible for each element, not
only is it less likely that the defamation caused the deprivation of
a liberty interest, but the methods of proof are much more difficult.
The Second Circuit's contextual inquiry has a different vir-
tue. While it promises higher decision costs, it facilitates greater
deterrence of bad actors. Under this paradigm, courts tailor the
incentives that tortfeasors face by allocating liability to deter ob-
jectionable behavior on a case-by-case basis. Rather than priori-
tizing minimalist rules, they calibrate deterrence to context.2 8
2. Design features of stigma plus.
Just as design choices reveal that stigma plus is a causation
test, they suggest that stigma plus is both a hurdle and an avenue
for prospective claims. As discussed in Part III.A.1, courts have
settled on a compromise position that is unusual in several re-
spects. First, despite initial skepticism toward claims grounded
256 State v Lawson, 688 P2d 479, 482 & n 3 (Utah 1984).
257 Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 105 (Chicago 1990). See also
Berrafato v Exner, 216 NW 165, 168 (Wis 1927) (referring to "the vexed term proximate
cause").
258 See Saul Levmore, Judging Deception, 74 U Chi L Rev 1779, 1789 (2007); Saul
Levmore, The Wagon Mound Cases: Foreseeability, Causation, and Mrs. Palsgraf, in
Robert L. Rabin and Stephen D. Sugarman, eds, Torts Stories 129, 146-50 (Foundation
2003). See also Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co, 162 NE 99, 103 (NY App 1928)
(Andrews dissenting) (referring to proximate cause as accomplishing "public policy" or a
"rough sense of justice").
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in a reputational injury,259 plaintiffs have been given a path for-
ward. Second, while that path requires that plaintiffs surmount
a hurdle (the plus requirement) not faced by most plaintiffs,260 a
plus is not a trump-there is no requirement that either element
be independently sufficient to support a claim.261 For example,
courts routinely permit plaintiffs without protected property in-
terests in their government employment to plead a stigma-plus
claim despite the fact that such plaintiffs would have no inde-
pendent cause of action for the loss of employment.22 Moreover,
the structure of the plus component constructs a high hurdle for
plaintiffs, but not one that is insurmountable.263
There are several reasons to think the interest in reputation
is stronger than the courts have let on. Most notably, a claim that
brings together the elements of stigma and plus is greater than
the sum of its parts. Considering the effects of the claim at the
margins, the interest in reputation is strong enough to permit
plaintiffs to ratchet up a plus element that is not otherwise a cog-
nizable interest into the basis for a colorable § 1983 action.264 Gov-
ernment employment in which plaintiffs have no independent
property interest is the typical example. Courts defend allowing
these plaintiffs to plead stigma-plus claims on the grounds that
Roth and Davis treat stigma and loss of employment accom-
plished together as pleading a liberty interest.265
Additionally, a stigma-plus claim may still be brought even
when the plus element constitutes a violation of an independently
cognizable state or federal right (and when the plaintiff could oth-
erwise bring a defamation claim).266 Claims with these features
often appear to be the strongest examples of stigma-plus claims.
For example, a hypothetical plaintiff post office clerk whose su-
pervisor publicly revealed the plaintiff's membership in an unpop-
ular religious group, made slurs and false claims about the plain-
tiff on this basis, spurring public outcry, and subsequently
participated in terminating the plaintiffs employment, could
259 See Davis, 424 US at 712.
260 See Part TII.A.1.
261 See note 106 and accompanying text.
262 See, for example, Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622, 633 n 13 (1980); Doe
v United States Department of Justice, 753 F2d 1092, 1104-12 (DC Cir 1985); Dennis v S
& S Consolidated Rural High School District, 577 F2d 338, 342-43 (5th Cir 1978).
263 See Part III.A.1.
264 See notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
265 See Doe, 753 F2d at 1106-07; Hill, 455 F3d at 237-38.
266 See Davis, 424 US at 712.
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likely make a slam-dunk stigma-plus claim even though such a
plaintiff would typically have independent avenues to vindicate
his rights, such as a state cause of action for defamation and a
state or federal cause of action for employment discrimination.
The fact that a stigma-plus claim is still viable despite these al-
ternative avenues suggests that there is something about the link
between the defamation and the infringed liberty interest that in-
dependently warrants action; a defamation suit would not suffi-
ciently vindicate the injury.
Yet this result is somewhat surprising. If the plaintiff has
such a strong plus claim-and possibly a strong defamation claim
as well-why does he need recourse to stigma plus? Perhaps the
availability of stigma-plus claims when other causes of action are
available, standing alone, could be explained by accidental or de-
liberate redundancy. There is no requirement that rights claims
be mutually exclusive, and there are considerable strategic ad-
vantages to being able to pursue multiple claims at once 267 or to
being able to jurisdiction or forum shop.268 However, treating
stigma plus as mere redundancy fails to grapple with the history
of the procedural due process right. While the underlying-rights
approach to procedural due process designates state statutes, con-
tracts, and other independent interests as touchstones, the
stigma-plus claim intentionally grafts an additional layer onto
state concepts of reputation or liberty deprivation. This may be a
high hurdle for litigants to meet, but it draws on a long history of
allowing reputation-based claims under the right circumstances.269
As Part III.A.1 reveals, courts made the apparent choice to
design and maintain the stigma-plus test out of a wide set of al-
ternatives. They are perfectly capable of foreclosing avenues for
claims entirely270 or of designing pleadings hurdles like the coram
nobis civil-disabilities test that serve only to constrict an existing
type of claim.271 With that test, courts seem to have concluded that
a conviction cannot cause cognizable coram nobis injury without
civil disabilities unique to conviction.272 By contrast, stigma plus
267 For example, plaintiffs could better protect themselves at the pleadings or fact
stages by having multiple claims to stand on if one is dismissed.
268 For example, plaintiffs could rely on stigma plus as a single federal claim to secure
federal pendant jurisdiction for related state claims.
269 See Part ID. 1.
270 See notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
271 See text accompanying notes 221-27.
272 Keane, 852 F2d at 203.
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implies that reputational injury can cause a cognizable liberty in-
fringement if accompanied by the requisite additional harm-
harm which need not itself support a separately cognizable claim.
The choice to design an evidentiary hurdle that paves a way
forward suggests instead that there is something in the stigma-
plus injury that requires separate deterrence. An accompanying
reputational harm compounds the harm represented by the vio-
lated right. This design choice also undermines the hypothesis
that stigma plus was designed to cabin excessive litigation or ex-
press hostility toward novel claims. If redundancy in available
causes of action is an aspect of courts' resistance to the stigma-
plus claim, they have nonetheless doubled down on permitting it
in this case.
3. Deterrent qualities of the Second Circuit's approach.
The salience of the deterrent effects of a given rule depends
on whether ex ante behavior is likely to vary between cases.273
This inquiry involves investigating the overall and marginal im-
pacts of a rule to determine if gains can be achieved through the
formulation of an alternative.274 Even if such impacts appear mi-
nor, incentives work on the margins; focusing on the individual or
average outcomes in every case may obscure the broader influ-
ence of court decisions.275 It also depends on whether the parties
to whom the rule applies face transaction costs. While parties can
bargain around the rule in a world of low transaction costs, 276 in
a world of high transaction costs, setting the initial rule has pro-
found distributive consequences. 277
The stigma-plus claim presents a context in which these de-
terrent effects matter. First, when it comes to deterring violations
of civil rights, it may be especially important to ensure that the
burden falls more heavily on rights violators than rights holders.
Rights holders enjoy the protection of a stable set of normative
commitments embodied in civil rights laws. By contrast, rights
violators behave in idiosyncratic and presumptively low-value
273 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 10-18 (1983) (discussing the ex ante effects of
marginal deterrents).
274 Id at 10.
275 Id at 11-12, 33-34.
276 See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960). See
also A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 13-14 (Aspen 3d ed 2003).
277 Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics at 14-15 (cited in note 276).
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ways. Second, the multiple-actor context presents a context in
which transaction costs may be high, presenting bargaining bar-
riers not only between the tortfeasor and the victim but also be-
tween the entities responsible for successive components of the
tort. This context is ripe for misunderstandings between the rele-
vant parties. Moreover, victims are in a poor position to predict
social torts of this nature and are likely to object on normative
grounds to the notion of bargaining over their reputations or other
liberty interests. Attention to deterring antisocial behavior at
each step of the inquiry can prevent these situations from arising.
Third, the marginal effects of the rule are relevant. Ex post,
the rule will prove an insuperable barrier to recovery only when
the stigma-plus claim is the sole viable claim for a given victim to
bring. When victims have multiple causes of action to choose
from, the unavailability of stigma plus is less likely to result in
incentives to violate rights. Victims can still deter defamation or
termination by bringing separate suits. But when defamation or
termination claims are unavailable, stigma plus may be the only
avenue for victims to vindicate their rights. Similarly, when the
convergence of reputational injury and subsequent harm repre-
sents an interest that is greater than the sum of its parts, the
availability of the stigma-plus claim will have greater im-
portance. For example, some plaintiffs might experience termina-
tion of employment because of erroneous sex-offender classifica-
tion as a particular affront to their dignity. As a result, putative
concerns about excessive litigation may make less headway
against stigma-plus claims than against other § 1983 or civil
rights suits. This suggests the First Circuit's efforts to privilege
limiting stigma-plus claims over ensuring they are carefully con-
sidered aims at a paper tiger.
Moreover, ex ante, the structure of the stigma-plus claim pro-
vides a separate deterrent effect at each phase of a putative rights
violation. The Second Circuit's approach is better calibrated to
supply this required deterrence for several reasons. As noted
above, stigma-plus claims are either redundant or designed to
capture a harm that is greater than the sum of its parts. In this
respect, in single-actor cases, the claim could have two separate
deterrent effects. It may add marginal deterrence to causing
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stigma and harm in conjunction, in cases in which the two ele-
ments are inflicted simultaneously,278 and it may deter causing
harm once stigma has been caused.279 In multiple-actor cases,
questions of deterrence grow more complicated. Each actor may
face different incentives at different times.
The First Circuit's test enables possible defendants to evade
two different types of claims. First, multiple actors may secretly
act in concert to inflict stigma plus. By merely exporting the harm
(or the stigma) to a different actor, government figures can evade
(additional) liability. For example, suppose that a city council
member would like to achieve political cover (or political consen-
sus) for terminating a disfavored at-will employee. The council
member could persuade a city employee occupying a different of-
fice to make the defamatory comments that she feels would justify
termination. Then the council could move to release the employee,
facing no liability whatsoever.
More worryingly-and more plausibly-the second actor can
free ride on the first actor's defamatory comments. If the infringed
liberty interest constituted a separately protected interest like a
Fourth Amendment right or an employment contract, the second
actor might already face liability for her actions.80 But she would
be foreclosed from facing the additional liability that stigma-plus
claims are designed to allocate for inflicting additional harm. As
a result, the volume of stigma-plus harms could spiral. For exam-
ple, the plaintiff city employee in Velez was injured above and be-
yond the loss of employment. Losing employment because of her
coworkers' stigmatizing remarks compounded the injury.281 Al-
lowing her recovery only under an employment statute might fail
to capture part of the injury she claims.
These problems are most likely to manifest in cases in which
the aggrieved party has no legal protections or proving or litigat-
ing the putative liberty interest is likely to prove very difficult.
This may or may not be a problem. On the one hand, injuries to
278 See, for example, Brandt v Board of Cooperative Education Services, 820 F2d 41,
45 (2d Cir 1987) (finding defamatory statements made at time of termination to qualify
under the stigma-plus test).
279 See Siegert v Gilley, 500 US 226, 233-34 (1991) (declining to find a stigma-plus
claim where "alleged defamation was not uttered incident to the termination of [ employ-
ment," but offered "several weeks later").
280 She also might not. The incentives depend to some extent on the different elements
of similarly available claims and on which of those elements are more readily provable.
281 See Velez, 401 F3d at 79.
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areas in which persons lack legal protections, such as at-will em-
ployment or bases of class protection not recognized in a particu-
lar jurisdiction, are to some extent injuries the legal system is less
invested in protecting. At-will employees may have received some
gain in return for accepting their employment; those who are not
members of protected classes may not warrant the courts' special
solicitude.
Yet the single-actor requirement seems to be a heavy-handed
response to this concern. If the goal is to deter litigants from
bringing claims resting on less than compelling liberty interests,
heightening the standard for what qualifies as a plus would more
closely serve this purpose. Moreover, in permitting unprotected
interests to serve as possible bases for stigma-plus claims, the
courts have also recognized that the primary harm associated
with stigma-plus claims is conjunctive. Even if a given state has
not chosen to extend full equal protection to LGBT persons, for
instance, it may be worth recognizing the liberty interest that is
infringed by losing employment on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Second Circuit's rule has two primary drawbacks of its
own. First, it may enable plaintiffs to evade causation and prox-
imity requirements. By permitting stigma-plus elements to de-
velop from distant figures' acts, the Second Circuit may make it
easier for plaintiffs to bring claims that are further afield from
the interests the stigma-plus claim was designed to protect. Sec-
ond, it permits first movers making defamatory comments to free
ride on the deprivations of liberty interests subsequently initiated
by others. Because the approach generally allocates liability to
the second actor rather than the first,282 although the defamatory
comments supply the stigma and are often analyzed for whether
they "caused" the harm, the first actor may escape substantive
liability.
Ultimately, neither of these effects is as concerning as those
effects stemming from the First Circuit's approach. The first con-
cern can be avoided by scrutinizing causation and proximity. The
Second Circuit's contextual approach illustrates how this might
work.283 If courts worry about attenuated claims, they can address
that concern head on by examining the attenuation, rather than
by implementing exclusionary rules. The second concern likely af-
flicts the First Circuit's approach as well. Moreover, it reflects a
282 See id at 93.
283 See id at 89. See also Part H.B.
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logical design for the claim. The stigma-plus concept emphasizes
the importance of the follow-on harm, without which the claim is
pure defamation. Defamation may be separately litigated and
presumptively elicits a lesser, or at least different, harm than
stigma-plus claims.
There is one additional arena in which the circuits' ap-
proaches may have varying effects: neither circuit's approach has
a neutral effect on litigation. It seems most likely that the Second
Circuit invites more litigation and more complex litigation by en-
dorsing a broader set of claims and by compelling litigation of
more complex causation questions. But in the context of infringe-
ments on liberty interests, reducing litigation isn't necessarily a
good thing.284 Instead, litigation costs must be weighed against
the deterrence benefits that come from a rule that discourages a
broader set of potentially infringing behaviors.
4. Unavoidable underdeterrence.
While the Second Circuit's approach appears to better ap-
proximate the deterrent goals of the stigma-plus claim, it fails to
completely deter possible harms for two primary reasons. First,
government employees are only weakly responsive to deterrence.
Second, the circuit generally requires state action to find a viable
stigma-plus claim.285
As to the first, to counter the suggestion in Part III.B.3 that
greater litigation might enhance the deterrent effects of the
Second Circuit's approach, the fact that the liable actor in a
stigma-plus claim is a state actor may mean increased litigation
does not translate to increased deterrence. In addition to the pro-
tections of sovereign immunity, state actors may not feel the pock-
etbook liabilities that claims against them represent, especially
by the time the relevant claim is filed and litigated or settled. In
particular, strategic behavior and underdeterrence are likely to
be more prevalent when the actor who supplies the second prong
284 Certainly there is a possibility of nuisance suits, provoking defendants shy of liti-
gation expenses into settlements unwarranted by the underlying facts. Yet for some of the
reasons explored in Part III.A.1, because the stigma-plus claim is primarily a hurdle at
the pleading rather than the facts stage, this concern is likely less profound than in other
civil contexts. Nuisance suits may be disposed of with less financial investment from the
annoyed party. See Blackmun, 60 NYU L Rev at 20-21 (cited in note 63) (pointing out that
any "burden" constitutional rights litigation places on the federal courts "presumably is
worth bearing when an action is meritorious").
285 The First Circuit's approach poses the same issue.
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of the claim is a figure of higher authority in the state govern-
ment and likely to be treated with a more deferential immunity
standard.286
As to the second, the Second Circuit's approach will in many
cases fail to address or deter cases in which the plus element was
supplied by a private actor rather than a state actor. As explained
in Part III.A.2, the Second Circuit has shown some sympathy for
stigma-plus claims that involve a private actor. It favorably cited
McGhee Ifor the proposition that state actors could ratify private
actors' stigmatizing statements. 287 Moreover, the Second Circuit
has approved stigma-plus claims rooted in sex-offender registra-
tion despite the fact that the concrete harms of erroneous regis-
tration flow in part from private actors.288
A rule that reached private actors' contributions to stigma-
plus claims might be desirable for several reasons. Taken to its
logical conclusion, concern for heightened deterrence might sug-
gest this extension is appropriate. Courts' approaches to mixed
private-public arrangements like sex-offender registries illus-
trate that private actors can become entangled with state actors'
actions, supporting viable stigma-plus claims. Moreover, private
actors are subject to the same-or greater-deterrence and free-
riding concerns as their state counterparts. But this argument
founders on different shoals: the requirement that a violation of
procedural due process be supplied by a state actor to be cogniza-
ble under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.289
Courts could evade the state-action bar by allocating liability
to the state actor. In a sex-offender-registry claim, for example,
courts appear to make one of two moves. In some cases, they for-
mally allocate liability to the perpetrator of the stigma rather
than the perpetrator of the plus. At other points, they view the
harms that follow from erroneous sex-offender registration to be
the incidents rather than the consequences of the registration it-
self. Yet courts have proven hesitant to allocate liability to the
first actor in a stigma-plus claim outside of the somewhat unusual
sex-offender-registry context. There are plausible justifications
for this choice. If the first actor bears liability, there will be no
286 See Brown v Montoya, 662 F3d 1152, 1165-68 (10th Cir 2011) (comparing immun-
ities outcomes for a police officer and a state secretary of corrections).
287 See notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
288 See note 244. See also text accompanying notes 248-50.
289 See Part III.A.2.
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meaningful way to deter the second actor from supplying a fol-
low-on harm in cases in which that harm is not a separate avenue
for recovery. If the full stigma-plus violation could be deterred
simply by focusing on the first node, that would be sufficient. But
given the impediments to holding state actors accountable dis-
cussed above, such an approach would likely heighten problems
of underdeterrence. Moreover, because the first prong of a stigma-
plus claim will typically require showing the elements of a defa-
mation claim, prospective plaintiffs already have access to an av-
enue to hold first actors liable for their claims. In the marginal
case, they lack such an avenue only for second actors. A final op-
tion would be to hold both the stigma and the plus actors liable in
a form of joint and several liability. This approach has the attrac-
tion of ensuring that neither party goes undeterred. Yet it poses
the trade-off of increased litigation complexity. Perhaps as a re-
sult, it does not appear to be deployed by courts.
The Second Circuit has a final rejoinder to these quibbles: it
allocates liability based on which party is positioned to supply the
missing procedures underlying the plaintiffs claimed due process
injury.290 The first actor in a multiple-actor stigma-plus claim, or
a purely private actor in either the first or the second position,
will rarely reach this point. This elegant approach may have the
added virtue of administrability. Despite underdeterrence con-
cerns, then, it is the Second Circuit that provides the contextual
approach best calibrated to allocate liability to the offending actor
and to distinguish in which cases private action is cognizable as
part of a stigma-plus claim.
CONCLUSION
Even after being linked to its historical context, compared to
other heightened pleading and scrutiny standards, and dissected
according to varying courts' approaches, the stigma-plus claim
appears to be unique. This unusual design initially appears to
rely on two distinct elements, stigma and plus, linked only by the
requirement of causation. So framed, the First Circuit's conclu-
sion that the same actor must supply each element may initially
appear plausible as a means of enforcing scrutiny of the causal
link.
But this approach to the stigma-plus claim fails to appreciate
the claim's overarching purpose. If its purpose were only to
290 See Velez, 401 F3d at 93.
1930 [84:1883
Stigma plus Whom?
vindicate two distinct claims, existing state defamation laws and
protections for underlying liberty interests would likely be suffi-
cient. The claim is better appreciated as an attempt to capture
the unique damage that the conjunction of stigma and harm sup-
ply. Those harms attach to single or multiple actors alike. It is
the Second Circuit's approach to the claim that thus best real-
izes its objectives-but for reasons that court left unexamined
and underdeveloped. This Comment has filled that gap by deriv-
ing the purpose of the stigma-plus claim, examining the claim in
action, and cataloguing the ways in which the Second Circuit's
approach is best able to vindicate the Court's peculiar frame.
Drawing on this analysis, many-but not all-of the prospec-
tive plaintiffs introduced at the beginning of this Comment have
viable claims. Under the dictates of Davis, the pure-reputation
plaintiff has no available federal remedy. The single-actor stigma-
plus plaintiff has a straightforward claim in any federal circuit.
The multiple-actor stigma-plus plaintiff has a viable claim in the
Second Circuit-and a good argument for bringing her claim any-
where else. Finally, the private-actor stigma-plus plaintiff may or
may not be able to recover. As the facts were presented in URI
Student Senate, recovery is unlikely. At a higher level of general-
ity, however, plaintiffs in her situation should not give up. De-
pending on the context-driven account described in Part II.B,
plaintiffs may be able to recover against state actors who ratify
private actors' conduct or to whom private actors' conduct may be
fairly attributed.
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